Ogunleye v. Banks

Background

Adejumoke Ogunleye, Maytinee Bird, and Marlene Frias, acting individually and as parents or guardians of students with disabilities, sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. They asked for a preliminary injunction—an order providing temporary relief while a case continues—requiring David C. Banks, Brad Lander, and the New York City Department of Education to immediately fund education-related expenses for their children.

The claimed expenses included tuition at the International Academy for the Brain, transportation provided by Sister’s Travel and Transportation Services, LLC, and nursing costs for the 2023–2024 school year. After the court ordered representatives of the Department of Education, the school, and the transportation provider to meet, the parties resolved most issues. Three issues remained: $8,175 in transportation costs for H.C., $9,449.32 in nursing expenses for H.C., and an unspecified amount of late fees allegedly caused by delayed implementation of the required placements.

The opinion states that the caption included Yvonne Davis, but plaintiffs’ counsel said at the hearing that the lawsuit was not brought on her behalf and that her inclusion was an error.

Legal standard and analysis

The court considered both theories offered by the plaintiffs. First, the plaintiffs argued that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “stay-put” provision, Section 1415(j), automatically required immediate payment. The court explained that this provision does not create a right to immediate payment unless the child’s placement is at risk.

The court found no evidence that the students were at risk of losing tuition or nursing services. The plaintiffs submitted letters from Sister’s Travel stating that transportation might stop if outstanding balances were not paid within thirty days. But the Department of Education had paid nearly all of the overdue transportation balance, leaving only $8,175 disputed, and the record did not show that transportation had stopped after more than thirty days had passed. The court therefore found no reason to believe that the students would lose transportation services.

Second, the court applied the traditional preliminary-injunction standard, which requires a showing including likely irreparable harm. The court concluded that, without a demonstrated risk to the students’ placements, money damages could adequately remedy the funding dispute. The court expressly did not decide the parties’ underlying dispute over the remaining $8,175, noting that it did not need to resolve that issue to decide the injunction motion.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction because they had not shown entitlement to an automatic injunction under Section 1415(j) or a threat of irreparable harm. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion at Doc. 15 and update the docket under Rule 25(d).