Smith v. Diaz

Background

C. Jay Smith alleged that, while incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison from 2013 to 2019, she experienced gender-based harassment and physical abuse. She alleged that prison employees failed to protect her, participated in harassment, and retaliated after she reported sexual harassment involving another inmate. She also alleged that prison officials denied her requests for separate showers or privacy screens for transgender women and later issued three Rules Violation Reports after the complaint.

Smith brought four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Ralph Diaz and Davis; a Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim against Duke, Haub, Bloise, and Taylor; a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim against Feston, Haub, and Bloise; and a Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claim against Duke, Haub, Bloise, Franco, and Taylor.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. Smith separately moved to exclude the testimony of Captain Rusty Hickethier, whom Defendants had identified first as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness, then as a non-retained expert, and finally as a retained rebuttal expert.

Summary-Judgment Rulings

The court applied the summary-judgment standard, under which the court must view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and may not weigh evidence or decide witness credibility.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. Defendants argued that Smith failed to properly complete the prison grievance process as to Diaz, Davis, Haub, and Feston. The court held that Smith exhausted her due-process claim against Feston to the extent it concerned the failure to make a requested witness available at the Deadly Weapon Rules Violation Report hearing. A grievance challenged that hearing, and prison reviewers found that Smith had not been afforded due process because the witness was absent without an explanation.

The court held, however, that Smith had not exhausted claims alleging Feston’s bias. It also held that Smith had not identified a grievance that sufficiently informed prison officials of Haub’s alleged misconduct or bias. The court granted summary judgment on exhaustion grounds as to Haub and as to any claims that Defendants deprived Smith of due process because of bias. It otherwise denied the motion on exhaustion grounds.

The court found a factual dispute over whether threats of retaliation made administrative remedies unavailable for some claims involving transgender accommodations and compliance with Prison Rape Elimination Act policies. Because resolving that dispute would require credibility determinations, the court could not decide it on summary judgment. The court ordered the parties to prepare for an evidentiary hearing at which the court would resolve the disputed exhaustion facts and remaining exhaustion questions.

Qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from liability for damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court declined to grant summary judgment based on qualified immunity. It explained that Defendants primarily disputed Smith’s version of events, including whether officials denied separate showers, mishandled or insulted her during the sexual-harassment investigation, and fabricated or improperly issued the Rules Violation Reports. Those factual disputes had to be viewed in Smith’s favor at this stage.

The court noted that qualified immunity did not apply to the official-capacity claims against Diaz and Davis because Smith clarified that she sought only declaratory and injunctive relief from them. The court also addressed Smith’s remaining equal-protection claim concerning alleged unequal treatment of transgender women, her due-process claim concerning the unavailable witness at the disciplinary hearing, and her retaliation claim. It denied the motion on qualified-immunity grounds because factual disputes prevented a ruling for Defendants.

Physical harm. Defendants argued that Smith could not maintain her claims without proof of physical injury. The court denied summary judgment on this ground. Smith testified that the inmate involved in the alleged harassment groped her breasts and buttocks repeatedly. The court stated that any conflict between that testimony and earlier reports presented a factual dispute. It also noted that the physical-injury limitation did not apply to claims for declaratory or injunctive relief or to claims for nominal or punitive damages.

Merits. The court denied summary judgment on the merits of Smith’s claims. It found that Smith had presented evidence supporting factual disputes about the denial of separate showers, officials’ responses to her sexual-harassment complaint, and the alleged manufacture of Rules Violation Reports after she complained about conditions affecting transgender women and after the sexual-harassment investigation began. The court emphasized that it could not resolve those factual disputes on summary judgment.

Injunctive relief. Defendants argued that Smith’s request for injunctive relief was moot because she had been transferred from San Quentin to the California Medical Facility. The court rejected that argument at this stage. Smith presented evidence that she continued to experience privacy problems at the California Medical Facility and remained eligible, at least as of late 2022, to transfer back to San Quentin. The court also found it premature to decide whether the requested relief was too broad because material factual disputes remained. It denied summary judgment on these issues.

Expert-Testimony Motion

Smith moved to exclude Captain Hickethier’s testimony. Defendants did not oppose excluding him as a non-retained expert, so the court granted the motion on that basis.

The court denied the motion to exclude Hickethier as a rebuttal expert. It found that the parties had not provided enough information for the court to determine in advance how his rebuttal testimony would be presented or whether it would conflict with his earlier Rule 30(b)(6) testimony. The court stated that Smith could challenge the testimony through cross-examination and that the court could address objections in context. If the case proceeded to trial, the court also said it might hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence to confirm that expert opinions were relevant and reliable.

Disposition and Next Steps

The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, it granted summary judgment on exhaustion grounds as to Haub and as to claims based on due-process bias, but otherwise denied the exhaustion arguments and denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity, physical harm, the merits, and injunctive relief.

The court also granted in part and denied in part Smith’s motion to exclude Defendants’ expert testimony: it granted the motion as to Hickethier’s testimony as a non-retained expert and denied it as to his testimony as a rebuttal expert. The court set an in-person case-management conference for April 22, 2025, and directed the parties to file a joint case-management statement by April 15, 2025.