Johnson v. County of Santa Clara

Background

Andrew Lee Johnson alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights during his arrest in 2014, his subsequent detention for more than three years, and the criminal proceedings that ended with his acquittal on attempted-murder and aggravated-assault charges. He was convicted of drug possession. The pending claims included evidence fabrication, failure to disclose favorable evidence, conspiracy, unlawful detention and malicious prosecution, and municipal liability against the City of San Jose and the County of Santa Clara. Johnson also brought a conditions-of-confinement claim against Deputy Jereh Lubrin.

Three groups of defendants moved for summary judgment under Rule 56. Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

City Defendants

The City of San Jose and Officers Marco Monzon, Jamie Lee Nicholas Hall, and Trent Tessler sought summary judgment on five claims.

For the Fourth Claim, alleging deliberate fabrication of evidence, the court held that Johnson had not provided specific admissible evidence showing that the officers deliberately manipulated key-fob data, misrepresented witness statements, or used coercive interview methods. The court therefore granted the motion as to the Fourth Claim against all officer defendants.

For the Fifth Claim, Johnson alleged that officers suppressed or destroyed favorable evidence. The court rejected the theory that the preliminary-hearing probable-cause finding automatically barred these claims, because probable cause was not an element of the evidence-disclosure theories at issue. The court nevertheless found no genuine factual dispute supporting Johnson’s claim that the officers withheld highly significant evidence from prosecutors in a way that caused his unusually long detention. It also found no sufficient evidence against Tessler concerning the key-fob data or a request to delete a statement from the wrong case file. The court granted the motion as to Tessler.

The court reached a different conclusion concerning Officers Monzon and Hall. Their recordings of the Castro brothers’ interviews were not available in the criminal case, and the parties offered competing explanations about whether the officers’ failure to upload the recordings reflected ordinary technical problems or deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for Johnson’s rights. The court held that a reasonable jury could find the recordings favorable and material and could find the required level of culpability. It therefore denied the motion as to Monzon and Hall on the Fifth Claim.

For the Sixth Claim, alleging conspiracy, the court held that the claim could not continue against Tessler because no underlying constitutional violation survived against him. As to Monzon and Hall, however, the court found factual disputes about whether their similar failures to upload potentially favorable recordings, followed by their failure to report the missing evidence, supported an inference of an implied agreement. The court denied the motion as to Monzon and Hall and granted it as to Tessler.

For the Seventh Claim, alleging unlawful detention and malicious prosecution, the court held that the criminal court’s probable-cause finding had preclusive effect. Johnson had not shown a factual basis for the exception involving fabricated evidence, and his decision not to testify at the preliminary hearing did not mean the probable-cause issue had not been fully litigated. Because probable cause was required for the claim, the court granted the motion as to all officer defendants.

For the Eighth Claim, Johnson alleged that San Jose had policies or practices of failing to preserve potentially favorable evidence and failing to train or supervise officers regarding missing evidence. The court found no evidence of a department-wide practice of failing to preserve evidence. But it found a genuine factual dispute about whether San Jose’s lack of policies requiring officers to confirm uploads, report missing files or system problems, and receive additional training could show deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional violations. The court denied the motion as to the Eighth Claim against San Jose.

County of Santa Clara

The County sought summary judgment on Johnson’s Second Claim, which alleged municipal liability for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Johnson relied on theories involving inadequate investigation of excessive-force complaints and a custom of placing pretrial detainees in solitary confinement without required out-of-cell time.

The court held that Johnson had not presented evidence connecting practices shown in other cases to the alleged violation in his own case. The County Audit and other evidence did not establish a widespread County policy or custom of deliberate indifference to excessive force. The court also held that Johnson had not shown that housing detainees based on their charges was unconstitutional or that any failure to provide minimum out-of-cell time was a widespread County policy, practice, or custom rather than an isolated or sporadic incident. The court granted the County’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Deputy Lubrin

Lubrin sought summary judgment on Johnson’s First Claim, a civil-rights claim concerning conditions of confinement. Johnson conceded that Lubrin did not use excessive force and relied primarily on Lubrin’s threat to conduct body-cavity checks on Black prisoners. The court held that threats without actual force did not establish the constitutional violation alleged. It also stated that Lubrin would be entitled to qualified immunity because the relevant circuit precedent clearly established that such threats were not unconstitutional. The court granted Lubrin’s motion for summary judgment.

Other rulings and final disposition

The court denied Johnson’s motion to strike portions of a declaration, denied as moot other portions of that motion, denied the County’s motion to strike the County Audit, and granted Johnson leave to supplement the record. The court’s final order granted in part and denied in part the City Defendants’ motion, granted the County’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted Lubrin’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Fourth and Seventh Claims were resolved in favor of the officer defendants; the Fifth and Sixth Claims were resolved in favor of Tessler but not Monzon and Hall; and the Eighth Claim against San Jose survived summary judgment.