Marshall Turman v. The Abyssinian Baptist Church

Background

Eboni Marshall Turman applied to become The Abyssinian Baptist Church’s senior pastor. She alleged that the church and Valerie S. Grant, the chair of the pulpit search committee, eliminated her from consideration because she is a woman. She asserted employment-discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law. She also claimed that the church breached an implied contract based on antidiscrimination language in the senior-pastor job description and the church’s bylaws.

The amended complaint alleged that Marshall Turman advanced through several stages of the selection process but was the only woman among the eleven candidates in the third round. She alleged that Grant and other committee members discussed excluding her because of her gender and that the five finalists were all men. The defendants disputed her allegation that she was more qualified than the finalists and argued that she lacked the necessary pastoral experience.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed reasonable inferences in Marshall Turman’s favor for purposes of the motion.

The defendants argued that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred the employment-discrimination claims. That doctrine protects a religious institution’s authority to choose the people who perform its religious functions. Neither side disputed that Marshall Turman was a minister seeking to perform ministerial duties or that Abyssinian was a religious institution that could invoke the doctrine.

Waiver

Marshall Turman argued that Abyssinian waived the ministerial exception by promising in the senior-pastor job announcement that it would not discriminate based on gender. The court assumed, without deciding, that the ministerial exception could be waived. It held that no waiver occurred here.

The court concluded that the bylaw provision opening church membership to people without regard to gender concerned congregational membership, not the hiring of a senior pastor. It also held that the job announcement’s general antidiscrimination statement was not clear enough to show that the church knowingly gave up its constitutional protection. The statement did not mention the church’s constitutional rights or say that the church accepted legal liability for decisions involving the senior pastor position.

Employment-Discrimination Claim Against Abyssinian

The court held that applying the ministerial exception was not premature. Marshall Turman sought, among other remedies, placement in the senior-pastor position. Ordering that remedy would interfere with the church’s authority to choose its minister. Even if she sought only money damages, the court reasoned, deciding whether the church’s stated reason—that she was not qualified—was a cover for gender discrimination would require the court to evaluate the church’s reasons for choosing its spiritual leader. The court held that this would impermissibly entangle it in the church’s religious affairs.

The court therefore dismissed Marshall Turman’s employment-discrimination claim against Abyssinian.

Breach-of-Contract Claim Against Abyssinian

The court also dismissed the breach-of-contract claim. It distinguished cases in which courts had allowed contract claims against religious institutions to proceed because those claims could potentially be resolved through neutral evidence. Here, determining whether the church breached a promise not to discriminate would require deciding whether it eliminated Marshall Turman because of her gender or because it considered her unqualified for the senior-pastor role. The court held that this was the same religiously entangling inquiry that barred the discrimination claim.

The court rejected the attempt to avoid the ministerial exception by labeling the claim as a contract claim based on the same alleged conduct.

Claims Against Grant and Disposition

Marshall Turman also asserted New York State and New York City employment-discrimination claims against Grant individually. The court held that the ministerial exception barred those claims as well because an agent of the religious organization could not be held liable under the same employment-discrimination theory when the claims against the organization were barred.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed the employment-discrimination claim against Abyssinian, the breach-of-contract claim against Abyssinian, and the employment-discrimination claims against Grant. The court’s conclusion states that Marshall Turman’s amended complaint was dismissed. The opinion does not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” designation.