Harper v. County of Marin

Background

Patrick Roy Harper, who represented himself, sued the County of Marin and the California Department of Fish and Wildlife. The complaint asserted claims under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and for tortious interference with contract. Harper based those claims on allegations concerning his arrest, criminal prosecution, and conviction, which he said harmed his commercial fishing business and livelihood.

The County moved to dismiss the claims against it based on res judicata, also called claim preclusion. Harper opposed that motion. He also moved to strike the County’s motion to dismiss, moved to strike the Department’s answer, submitted another motion to strike, and asked the court to refer the case to the United States Attorney General’s Office for investigation and possible criminal prosecution.

Motion to Dismiss

The court held that claim preclusion barred Harper’s claims against the County. It explained that claim preclusion requires an identity of claims, a final judgment on the merits, and privity between the parties.

First, the court found that the current claims and Harper’s earlier case arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts. Although the current complaint used antitrust and tortious-interference theories rather than the constitutional theories asserted earlier, both cases concerned the same alleged arrest and prosecution and relied on virtually identical evidence.

Second, the court found that the earlier case had been dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice, for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. The court treated that dismissal as a judgment on the merits for claim-preclusion purposes.

Third, the court found privity between the County and the County employees sued in their official capacities in the earlier case. The court rejected Harper’s argument that alleged admiralty jurisdiction prevented claim preclusion, explaining that claim preclusion also applies in admiralty cases.

Because claim preclusion barred the claims against the County, the court dismissed them with prejudice and without leave to amend. The court did not reach the County’s alternative arguments that Harper failed to state a claim for relief, concluding that amendment would be futile because of the judgment in the earlier case.

Harper’s Motions

The court denied Harper’s motion to strike the County’s motion to dismiss. It found that the County’s motion was not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous and that Harper identified no legal basis for striking it. The court also found that Harper’s reliance on admiralty law and on a Supreme Court decision concerning maritime-contract choice-of-law provisions did not support striking the County’s motion.

The court denied Harper’s motion to strike the Department’s answer. Harper did not identify a defect in the answer that would justify striking it. The court also stated that the answer raised factual disputes and affirmative defenses, so Harper was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

The court denied Harper’s request for referral to the United States Attorney General’s Office. It based that ruling on the fact that the request relied on the same allegations that had already been dismissed with prejudice as to the County.

Disposition

Judge Rita F. Lin granted the County’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. All claims against the County were dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. The court denied Harper’s Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike Answer, Motion to Strike, and Request for Referral. The opinion does not state that the claims against the Department were dismissed.