Lopez v. Guziczek
- Nelson Roman
- 7:21-cv-10099
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 8
In Lopez v. Guziczek, Judge Roman denied Lopez’s reconsideration motion because it used the wrong rule and her claims remained time-barred.
Crystal Lopez’s claims against Police Officer Christopher Guziczek, Police Officer John Doe 1, and Police Officer John Doe 2 remained dismissed with prejudice after the court denied her motion for reconsideration.
What happened
In Lopez v. Guziczek, Crystal Lopez sued Police Officer Christopher Guziczek and two unidentified officers over her 2018 arrest, alleging excessive force, false arrest, and other civil-rights violations. The court had previously dismissed her claims with prejudice as too late, and Lopez asked the court to reconsider.
The court said Lopez used Rule 59(e), which applies to changing certain judgments, but Rule 60(b) was the proper rule for asking the court to reconsider this final order. The court also said the motion was filed too late under the applicable local rule. Even if the court considered the motion under the proper rule, it would still fail because Lopez’s claims were filed and served after the applicable deadlines, and her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint.
Judge Roman denied Lopez’s motion for reconsideration and directed the clerk to terminate the motion. The earlier dismissal of Lopez’s claims with prejudice therefore remained in place.
The detailed version
- Lopez v. Guziczek · No. 7:21-cv-10099
- Nelson Roman
- Apr. 16, 2025
Background
Crystal Lopez brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, against Police Officer Christopher Guziczek, Police Officer John Doe 1, and Police Officer John Doe 2. She alleged excessive force, false arrest, cruel and unusual punishment, fabrication of evidence, malicious prosecution, and deliberate indifference based on her arrest on November 27, 2018. Lopez alleged that she was arrested after going onto Mount Vernon High School’s grounds while seeking help after the vehicle in which she was traveling stopped on the Cross County Parkway. She was later acquitted of the charges against her on May 23, 2019.
The court previously granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on December 12, 2024, ruling that Lopez’s claims were time-barred. The court dismissed the claims with prejudice and terminated the action. Lopez then moved for reconsideration.
Reconsideration Standard and Applicable Rule
Lopez identified Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) as the basis for her motion. The court explained that Rule 59(e) and Southern District of New York Local Rule 6.3 require a timely request to alter or reconsider a ruling, generally based on controlling law or facts the court overlooked. Local Rule 6.3 required notice of the motion within 14 days after the original ruling, but Lopez filed her motion 28 days after the December 12, 2024 decision.
The court further held that Rule 60(b), rather than Rule 59(e), was the proper rule for seeking relief from a final order. Because the court had dismissed Lopez’s claims with prejudice and terminated the action, its earlier decision was a final order. The court therefore concluded that Lopez’s motion was improperly brought under Rule 59(e). The court nevertheless briefly addressed why the motion would also fail on the substance of her arguments.
Statute of Limitations
The court stated that § 1983 claims in New York generally have a three-year limitations period. It determined that Lopez’s false-arrest, excessive-force, cruel-and-unusual-punishment, and deliberate-indifference claims accrued on the date of her initial arrest, November 28, 2018. Her fabrication-of-evidence and malicious-prosecution claims accrued when she was acquitted on May 23, 2019.
The court explained that filing a complaint pauses the limitations period during the 90-day period for service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. If service is not completed during that period, however, the limitations period applies again, and the plaintiff must refile before the limitations period ends. The court said that an extension of time to serve the complaint for good cause did not further pause the limitations period.
Accounting for the relevant periods, including the 90-day service period and COVID-19-related tolling, the court concluded that the false-arrest, excessive-force, cruel-and-unusual-punishment, and deliberate-indifference claims expired on either July 14, 2022, or October 12, 2022. The court noted that the exact calculation was unclear but that either date was well before service was completed on October 11, 2023. The court concluded that the claims were time-barred. It likewise concluded that the fabrication-of-evidence and malicious-prosecution claims were time-barred because their applicable deadlines also preceded service.
Relation Back
Lopez also argued that her amended complaint should relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Relation back can allow an amended pleading to be treated as filed on the date of an earlier pleading when the legal requirements are met.
The court rejected that argument. It said that changing the caption, changing the requested damages from a specified amount to an amount to be determined by a jury, and reducing the number of unidentified defendants from five to two did not qualify. Lopez had not added a new defendant, changed the name of an existing defendant, or identified one of the John Doe defendants. The court held that Rule 15(c) did not provide relief for these changes and that the amended complaint did not relate back.
Disposition
Judge Nelson S. Roman denied Lopez’s motion for reconsideration. The court directed the clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 52. The opinion did not reopen the case or alter the prior dismissal with prejudice.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.