Kunzer v. Foster

Background

Kenneth R. Kunzer bought land in Becker County, Minnesota, from Stuart G. Foster and DeAnna Foster in 1997. The land was subject to a restrictive covenant requiring single-family homes to have a main floor of at least 1,500 square feet. After Stuart Foster declined Kunzer’s request to remove the covenant, Kunzer consulted attorney Samuel S. Rufer about the restriction.

Kunzer later brought a quiet-title action in Minnesota state court against the Fosters, Carpets ’N More, Inc., and Kim A. Ach. Judge Gretchen D. Thilmony presided over that case, while attorneys Patrick A. Bakken and Mark J. Kemper represented other parties. Judge Thilmony dismissed Kunzer’s state-court action, upheld the restrictive covenant, imposed sanctions and fees, and restricted new related filings without judicial authorization. The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed Kunzer’s appeal of the dismissal as untimely and affirmed the sanctions order.

Kunzer then filed this federal action against Stuart G. Foster, DeAnna Foster, Carpets ’N More, Inc., Kim A. Ach, The Estate of Steve B. Ach, Gretchen D. Thilmony, Samuel S. Rufer, Mark J. Kemper, and Patrick A. Bakken. His complaint asserted state-law tort claims, claims under Sections 1983 and 1985, and claims based on numerous federal and state criminal statutes. All defendants moved to dismiss.

Claims Against Judge Thilmony

The court held that judicial immunity protected Judge Thilmony from suit. Kunzer challenged her rulings in the state-court action, including dismissing his lawsuit, imposing sanctions, and denying authorization to file a new action. The court determined that these were judicial acts and that Kunzer had not shown either of the two relevant exceptions: a nonjudicial act or an act taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. The claims against Judge Thilmony were dismissed with prejudice.

Claims Based on Criminal Statutes

The court held that private citizens generally have no standing to enforce criminal statutes or start federal criminal proceedings. It applied the same conclusion to claims based on the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, and Minnesota Statutes Section 484.08, as identified in the opinion. Claims premised on criminal statutes were dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 Claim

Kunzer alleged that the defendants conspired during the state-court litigation to deprive him of constitutional rights. Because all defendants except Judge Thilmony were private parties, Kunzer needed to plausibly allege a meeting of the minds between a private defendant and a state actor to accomplish an unlawful objective.

The court found that filing motions with a judge, and the judge’s decision to grant those motions, did not by themselves show an agreement to violate Kunzer’s rights. It also found that the attorneys’ other alleged conduct was private conduct in the course of legal representation, not action under color of state law. The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims with prejudice. It did not decide the defendants’ argument that the claims were barred by the rule limiting federal review of state-court judgments because the claims failed on the merits of the conspiracy allegations.

Section 1985 Claim

The court construed Kunzer’s unclear Section 1985 claim as arising under the first clause of Section 1985(3). That provision requires, among other things, a conspiracy motivated by class-based discriminatory animus. The court found that Kunzer alleged only personal hostility toward him, not discrimination against a protected class or group. It dismissed the Section 1985 claim with prejudice.

Remaining State-Law Claims

After dismissing all claims over which it had original federal jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law tort claims. Those claims included allegations concerning trespass, interference with land, timber, a harassment restraining order, a structure, and legal malpractice. The court dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice so they could be considered, if at all, by Minnesota courts. The order specifically stated that any legal-malpractice claim against Rufer was dismissed without prejudice.

Disposition

The court granted all defendants’ motions to dismiss. The order specified these dispositions:

- Count I: dismissed without prejudice. - Count II: dismissed without prejudice. - Count III: claims based on criminal statutes dismissed with prejudice; otherwise dismissed without prejudice. - Count IV: dismissed with prejudice; any legal-malpractice claim against Rufer dismissed without prejudice. - Count V: dismissed with prejudice. - Count VI: dismissed without prejudice. - Count VII: dismissed without prejudice. - Count VIII: dismissed with prejudice. - Count IX: dismissed with prejudice.

The court also denied Kunzer’s request to amend his complaint, finding that the proposed amendments would not prevent dismissal. Judgment was ordered to be entered.