White v. Jonathan E. Karesh
- PHK
- 3:25-cv-04269
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 12
In White v. Karesh, Judge PHK dismissed without prejudice pro se plaintiff Elizabeth Curry White's complaint against a California Superior Court judge, finding her federal tort and civil rights claims legally defective.
Pro se litigants who have been designated as vexatious litigants in California state court and seek to challenge that designation in federal court; individuals attempting to sue state court judges under the Federal Tort Claims Act or Section 1983 for judicial acts.
What happened
In White v. Karesh (No. 25-cv-04269-PHK), Elizabeth Curry White, representing herself, sued California Superior Court Judge Jonathan E. Karesh in federal court. Her complaint challenged her designation as a 'vexatious litigant' in California state court — a label that required her to get court approval before filing new lawsuits — and sought both money damages and an order undoing that designation. She brought two claims: one under the Federal Tort Claims Act and one under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
The court found multiple fatal problems with both claims. The Federal Tort Claims Act claim failed because that law only applies to employees of the federal government, and Judge Karesh is a state court judge, not a federal employee. The Section 1983 civil rights claim was blocked by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — a legal rule that prevents federal district courts from reviewing state court decisions — because White was essentially asking a federal court to overturn rulings made by the California Superior Court. The court also found that judges are absolutely immune from money damages for actions taken in their official judicial capacity, which covered everything Karesh did that White complained about. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has already upheld California's vexatious litigant law against constitutional challenges, making a facial attack on that statute legally unavailable.
The magistrate judge dismissed White's complaint without prejudice and gave her until September 25, 2026, to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in the order. The judge denied as moot White's own motion for leave to amend (since the court was already granting leave to amend), denied without prejudice her motion for a trial date and related filings as premature, and denied with prejudice several notices and a letter she had sent seeking action on the pending screening order, finding those moot. The court warned that failure to file a timely amended complaint could result in dismissal with prejudice.
The detailed version
- White v. Jonathan E. Karesh · No. 3:25-cv-04269
- PHK
- Aug. 25, 2026
Background
Plaintiff Elizabeth Curry White filed this action pro se (without a lawyer) against Jonathan E. Karesh, identified in the opinion as a California Superior Court Judge. The court previously granted White's application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) — meaning without paying court filing fees — under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This triggered the court's mandatory obligation to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before allowing the case to proceed.
White's complaint challenged her designation as a "vexatious litigant" by the California Superior Court — a status under California law that requires a person to obtain court approval (via a prefiling order) before filing new lawsuits — and the denial of her request to vacate that prefiling order. She alleged this affected her ability to pursue other civil cases involving property, inheritances, and a job injury claim. She sought monetary relief of "hundreds of thousands of dollars" and injunctive relief (a court order) vacating the prefiling order. Her complaint used a combination of California and Northern District of Florida pro se form complaints.
The court liberally construed the complaint as asserting two causes of action: (1) a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows certain tort suits against the federal government; and (2) a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses.
Jurisdiction
The court first analyzed subject matter jurisdiction (the court's power to hear the type of case) and personal jurisdiction (the court's power over the defendant).
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was found improper because both White and Karesh listed California addresses in the complaint, destroying complete diversity — a requirement that no plaintiff and no defendant share the same state citizenship.
Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was found adequately pled because the FTCA and § 1983 are federal statutes that confer jurisdiction on federal district courts.
Personal jurisdiction was found adequately pled under general jurisdiction principles because the complaint alleged Defendant is a California resident, and an individual's domicile is the paradigm basis for general jurisdiction.
Section 1915 Merits Screening
Frivolousness (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i))
The court found both claims frivolous — meaning they lacked any arguable basis in law.
FTCA claim
The FTCA waives sovereign immunity only for torts by "employees of the Government," defined as officers or employees of federal entities. Karesh is a state judicial officer, not a federal employee, so he cannot be sued under the FTCA. The court cited Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Service and Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty. in support.
§ 1983 claim
The court found this claim barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments. White's claim was, in substance, an attempt to get a federal court to overturn the California Superior Court's vexatious litigant designation and prefiling order — precisely what Rooker-Feldman forbids. The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit has already upheld California's vexatious litigant statutory scheme against constitutional challenges (citing Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120), making a facial constitutional attack on that statute frivolous as well.
The court declined to make an express finding of maliciousness (that the complaint was filed to harm another), noting that while White's vexatious litigant status could potentially support such an inference, the record did not mandate that finding.
Failure to State a Claim (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii))
Applying the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) — requiring factual allegations sufficient to make a claim plausible on its face — the court found both claims failed.
The complaint's characterizations of Karesh's conduct as "inhuman" or "cruel" were dismissed as conclusory, not factual allegations entitled to any presumption of truth.
For the FTCA claim, even accepting all facts as true, Karesh is a state judicial officer and not a cognizable defendant under that statute.
For the § 1983 claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that frequent pro se litigants do not constitute a suspect class and that California's vexatious litigant statute does not burden a fundamental right, so the statute's application does not establish a constitutional violation. The claim also independently failed under Rooker-Feldman for the reasons discussed above.
Judicial Immunity from Monetary Relief (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii))
Judges are absolutely immune from money damages for acts performed in their judicial capacity. The acts at issue — designating White as a vexatious litigant and imposing a prefiling order — are quintessentially judicial functions. The complaint does not allege any action by Karesh outside his judicial role, and allegations of error (without alleging a complete absence of jurisdiction) do not overcome judicial immunity. Accordingly, the court found dismissal of all monetary relief claims mandatory.
Disposition of All Pending Motions and Filings
- Complaint [Dkt. 1]: DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. - Leave to amend: GRANTED. White may file a First Amended Complaint on or before September 25, 2026. - Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [Dkt. 22]: DENIED AS MOOT (because the court independently granted leave to amend). - Motion for Trial [Dkt. 24] and related Petition for Judicial Review Speedy Trial Date [Dkt. 14] and similar Notices [Dkts. 17, 20, 21]: DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as premature, because the pleadings are not finalized and no defendant has yet appeared. - Notices and letter seeking issuance of the screening order [Dkts. 15, 16, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27]: DENIED WITH PREJUDICE as moot.
Guidance for Amendment
The court noted that amendment faces significant legal obstacles given the deficiencies identified. It directed White to: identify specific conduct by Karesh (not merely conclusory labels); address all legal deficiencies identified; file a complete amended complaint that does not incorporate the prior complaint by reference; use the court's own form complaint; and include all claims and defendants she wishes to pursue. The court warned that failure to file a timely amended complaint could result in dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.