Lucero v. Arce

Background

Charles Patrick Lucero, a California prisoner proceeding without an attorney, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), CDCR Secretary Jeff Macomber, officials at Salinas Valley State Prison, and unnamed correctional staff members identified as “Does 1-50.” The court separately granted permission to proceed without paying the filing fee.

Lucero alleged that, on July 24, 2024, unnamed staff members searched him, grabbed his genitals, punched and choked him, and that he later suffered a mild heart attack. He also alleged that Dr. Mendez, a psychologist, knew he was suicidal and had previously attempted suicide but refused to authorize placement in a crisis bed allegedly required by prison regulations. Lucero further alleged that he was placed in administrative segregation without legitimate disciplinary reasons, that Sergeant Avalos “tortured” him there, and that he lacked lights or power for his continuous positive airway pressure machine. He asserted excessive-force and inadequate-medical-care claims under the Eighth Amendment, a due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a California claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Screening standard

Because Lucero sought relief from governmental defendants, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. At this stage, the court had to identify claims that could be heard and decided and dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also liberally construed Lucero’s allegations because he was not represented by an attorney. To state a claim under § 1983, he had to allege both a violation of a federal right and conduct by a person acting under state authority.

Claims

Excessive force

The allegations that unnamed defendants punched, choked, and sexually assaulted Lucero while he was in waist restraints supported a reasonable inference of unconstitutional excessive force. Because Lucero did not know those defendants’ names, the court allowed him to conduct discovery and amend his complaint to identify them. The court found Sergeant Avalos’s alleged “torture” too vague because Lucero did not describe what Avalos did or whether the alleged conduct was physical or psychological. That claim was dismissed with leave to amend.

Administrative segregation

The court held that Lucero had not plausibly alleged a due-process violation based on his placement in administrative segregation. He did not identify which procedural protections he received or which protections officials failed to provide. His allegations that officials relied on false or fabricated evidence were also conclusory because he did not describe the evidence, explain what was false, or identify the charges. He also did not identify which defendants caused his placement or describe each defendant’s conduct. The court dismissed this claim with leave to amend, except as to CDCR.

Medical care

The court found that Lucero’s allegations against Dr. Mendez were sufficient to support a plausible Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. In particular, Lucero alleged that Mendez knew about his suicidal thoughts and prior suicide attempts, that prison regulations required a crisis-bed placement in those circumstances, and that Mendez refused to authorize that placement.

The court dismissed the inadequate-medical-care claim against every defendant other than Dr. Mendez because Lucero did not allege facts showing that those defendants were involved in his medical care or caused the alleged harm. Those dismissals were with leave to amend, except for CDCR, whose claims were dismissed without leave to amend.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The court found that Lucero plausibly alleged a California claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Mendez based on the alleged failure to respond appropriately to his suicidal condition. The allegations concerning the unnamed defendants’ use of excessive force also supported a plausible claim, but Lucero had to identify those defendants in an amended complaint. The claim was dismissed as to the other defendants, with leave to amend, except for CDCR.

CDCR and other named defendants

The court dismissed the claims against CDCR without leave to amend because the Eleventh Amendment bars damages claims against CDCR in federal court. Lucero also did not allege conduct by Secretary Macomber, Acting Wardens Arce and Schuyler, Associate Deputy Wardens Ortega and Fonseca, or Dr. Russell. The court explained that supervisory status alone does not establish liability and gave Lucero leave to amend to allege facts showing how those defendants personally caused a constitutional violation.

Disposition

The order states that the complaint supports claims against Dr. Mendez for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law. The claims against CDCR were dismissed without leave to amend. All other claims against all other defendants were dismissed with leave to amend. Lucero could file an amended complaint by June 18, 2025, and could conduct discovery to learn the names of the Doe defendants. If he did not timely file an adequate amended complaint, service would be ordered based only on the claims against Dr. Mendez that the court found capable of proceeding.