Diaz v. New York Paving Inc.

Background

Plaintiff Diaz sued New York Paving Inc. individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. The plaintiffs alleged that the company failed to pay them for work performed before the scheduled start time at the first off-site job location and after the last off-site job location. Their claims included overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), overtime and unpaid-wage claims under the New York Labor Law (NYLL), and a NYLL claim concerning wage statements.

The plaintiffs were represented by workers’ labor unions. The relevant agreements included an expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between New York Paving and Laborers’ Local 1010, an expired CBA between New York Paving and Local 175, and a current March 2024 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between New York Paving and Local 1010. The opinion states that Local 175 was not a party to the MOA.

The employer’s motions

New York Paving moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) or by the labor-law rule associated with San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon. It also moved for partial summary judgment under Rule 56. The employer separately sought summary judgment on other issues, preclusion of liquidated damages, decertification of the class, and application of Garmon preemption.

Section 301 preemption

Section 301 preemption applies when a claim depends on interpreting a collective bargaining agreement rather than merely referring to it. The court found that the central factual dispute was whether pavers were required to perform work at a central site before the first job or after the last job. The plaintiffs said the work was required; the employer said workers voluntarily arrived at the central site to receive transportation to and from the job sites.

The court held that the expired CBAs did not preempt the claims. Those agreements were silent about preliminary and postliminary work, and deciding whether a past practice or custom required that work would depend on testimony and evidence outside the agreements. The court also relied on Second Circuit precedent stating that an expired CBA generally has no effect for Section 301 purposes except in defining the status quo.

The court reached a different conclusion about the March 2024 MOA. It stated that the MOA expressly provided that, beginning in March 2024, non-drivers were not required to perform preliminary or postliminary shift work. Because the plaintiffs’ theory conflicted with that provision, deciding whether they were entitled to pay required examining the MOA. The court therefore held that the FLSA and NYLL claims of Local 1010 members accruing on or after the MOA’s effective date were preempted.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the transportation arrangement did not exist despite the MOA’s wording. According to the court, for claims arising on or after March 2024, proving that the employer required the work would simultaneously require proving that the employer breached the MOA. That connection likewise made the claims preempted.

Disposition

The court granted New York Paving’s motion in part as to the FLSA and NYLL claims by Local 1010 members accruing on or after the effective date of the March 2024 MOA. The court denied the motion in all other respects. It specifically stated that the employer’s other summary-judgment motions, request to preclude liquidated damages, request for class decertification, and Garmon-preemption motion were without merit and denied.