Mackenzie P. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- Pitts
- 5:24-cv-06314
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 8
In Mackenzie P. v. Commissioner of Social Security, Judge Pitts remanded after finding the disability decision did not address attendance-related limits in the work assessment.
Mackenzie P. and the Social Security Administration proceedings concerning her application for child’s insurance benefits and disability insurance benefits.
What happened
In Mackenzie P. v. Commissioner of Social Security, Mackenzie P. challenged an administrative law judge’s denial of child’s insurance benefits and disability insurance benefits. The court reviewed the administrative decision under the Social Security Act.
The administrative law judge found that Mackenzie P. had several severe mental impairments and could perform certain repetitive, slower-paced jobs with limited workplace interaction. Mackenzie P. argued that the work-capacity assessment did not include all the moderate limitations identified by consultative examiner Dr. Tania Shertock, particularly limitations involving attendance and completing a normal workday or workweek.
The court granted summary judgment for Mackenzie P. and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. Judge Pitts ruled that the administrative law judge had not explained why the attendance-related limitations were omitted from the work-capacity assessment or otherwise supported that omission with substantial evidence.
The detailed version
- Mackenzie P. v. Commissioner of Social Security · No. 5:24-cv-06314
- Pitts
- Apr. 28, 2025
Background
Mackenzie P. sought review of an administrative law judge’s denial of her application for child’s insurance benefits and disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing at which Mackenzie P. and a vocational expert testified, the administrative law judge denied the application on May 10, 2024. The Appeals Council denied review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.
The administrative law judge applied the five-step disability analysis. The judge found that Mackenzie P. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of October 18, 2013, and had severe impairments including major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and panic disorder. The judge found that the impairments did not meet or medically equal the listed impairments for depressive, anxiety, or neurodevelopmental disorders.
The administrative law judge determined that Mackenzie P. had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her limitations—to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to mental and workplace restrictions. Those restrictions included repetitive work with a low pace, incidental interaction with the public, no more than occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, and no tandem work or collaborative teamwork. The judge found that she could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including lab equipment cleaner, office cleaner, and cleaner II.
Issue and analysis
Mackenzie P. argued that the residual functional capacity was not supported by substantial evidence because the administrative law judge found Dr. Tania Shertock’s opinion persuasive as to moderate mental-health limitations but did not include several limitations identified in that opinion or explain their omission.
Dr. Shertock identified moderate impairments involving complex instructions, attention and concentration, pace, stress, persistence, adapting to changes in routine work settings, and the ability to complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from a psychiatric condition. The administrative law judge included restrictions addressing some limitations, including attention, pace, stress, and adapting to changes in routine work settings, but did not include attendance-related restrictions concerning workday or workweek completion.
The court rejected the government’s argument that the restrictions to repetitive, non-fast-paced work adequately addressed all of Dr. Shertock’s findings. The court explained that those restrictions might address concentration, persistence, and pace, but did not necessarily address attendance. The court also rejected the argument that a “moderate” limitation necessarily meant Mackenzie P. could function satisfactorily. The court stated that, if the evidence was unclear about the specific attendance restrictions required, the administrative law judge had a duty to develop the record and conduct an appropriate inquiry.
Ruling and disposition
The court held that the residual functional capacity did not account for the attendance-related limitations identified in Dr. Shertock’s opinion. Because the administrative law judge found the opinion persuasive as to the moderate limitations it identified but gave no reasons for rejecting or incorporating the attendance-related limitations, the court found legal error and concluded that the residual functional capacity was not supported by substantial evidence.
Judge P. Casey Pitts granted Mackenzie P.’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. On remand, the administrative law judge was ordered to develop the record regarding functional work restrictions resulting from the attendance-related limitations and either incorporate those restrictions into the residual functional capacity or explain, with substantial-evidence support, why they could be disregarded. The opinion did not award benefits.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.