Morhaus v. Bisignano

Background

Mark M. applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) — a federal program providing financial support to people with disabilities who demonstrate financial need — on December 4, 2020, alleging disability from that date. His alleged impairments included neuropathy, diabetes, asthma, lower back issues, and anxiety. His application was denied at the initial and reconsideration levels. An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a written decision on February 24, 2023, finding him not disabled. After Mark M. sought judicial review, the parties stipulated to a remand. On remand, the ALJ held a supplemental hearing on February 11, 2025, and issued a partially favorable decision on March 7, 2025, finding Mark M. not disabled before November 25, 2023, but disabled as of that date due to a change in his age category under the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.

For the period before November 25, 2023, the ALJ found that Mark M. had severe impairments including lumbar degenerative disc disease, diabetes with peripheral neuropathy, asthma, emphysema, cardiomegaly and heart murmur, mild neurocognitive disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. The ALJ concluded Mark M. did not meet any listed impairment at step three, assessed a residual functional capacity (RFC — the most a claimant can still do despite limitations) for light work with restrictions to simple instructions and no specific production-rate pace, and found at step five that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Mark M. could perform.

Mark M. then filed this action for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Standard of Review

The court's review was limited to whether substantial evidence on the record as a whole supported the Commissioner's decision, or whether the ALJ committed a legal error. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the conclusion. The court may not reverse simply because substantial evidence could support a different outcome.

Issue 1: Evaluation of Dr. Anderson's Opinion

Social Security regulations (20 C.F.R. § 416.920c) require ALJs to evaluate medical opinions for persuasiveness using several factors, the two most important being supportability (how well the source's own evidence justifies the opinion) and consistency (how well the opinion fits with evidence from other sources). The ALJ must articulate how both factors were considered.

Dr. Anderson completed a Mental Functioning Questionnaire on January 20, 2023, opining that Mark M. had marked limitations in all areas of mental functioning, would be off-task 20% of the time, would need unscheduled breaks, would miss work more than three times a month, and could work only 10–15 hours per week. The ALJ found this opinion not well supported by Dr. Anderson's own treatment records, which documented, among other things, Mark M.'s reports of no problems with concentration, cooperative demeanor, fair mood, improved depression, and better sleep. The ALJ also found the opinion inconsistent with Mark M.'s own reported symptoms, observations by other providers, and other objective testing. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Anderson had recommended Mark M. seek employment and gave him a job referral.

Mark M. argued the ALJ mischaracterized the progress note about employment. The court disagreed, finding the note showed Dr. Anderson was supportive of Mark M.'s job search and provided a referral, and that this was only one of several inconsistencies the ALJ identified. The court found no legal error and that substantial evidence supported the persuasiveness assessment.

Issue 2: Opinions of Dr. Phillippi and Dr. Hall

Mark M. argued that the opinions of Drs. Phillippi and Hall were consistent with Dr. Anderson's opinion and should have bolstered its persuasiveness. The court found this argument unavailing because the ALJ also found those opinions not persuasive.

Dr. Hall conducted a neuropsychological evaluation in December 2024 and noted struggles with most areas of cognitive functioning, but his only specific functional limitation was a need for unspecified breaks, conditioned by the word "might." The ALJ found this not persuasive because: the limitation was inadequately explained; it was qualified by "might"; the evaluation occurred after the November 25, 2023 disability date; Dr. Hall did not have the full record; and the limitation was inconsistent with mental-examination findings of intact cognition.

Dr. Phillippi conducted a consultative examination in May 2024 and opined that Mark M. had marked limitations in several areas. The ALJ found this not persuasive because it was completed after the disability date and was inconsistent with evidence from the relevant period preceding that date — though the ALJ acknowledged it was well supported by Dr. Phillippi's own examination and narrative.

Mark M. argued the ALJ could not reject these opinions based on timing alone. The court agreed that timing alone cannot be a basis for rejection (citing Mike S. v. Saul), but found the ALJ did not rely on timing alone. For Dr. Hall, the ALJ also cited lack of a treatment relationship and absence of the full record. For Dr. Phillippi, the ALJ explained elsewhere in the decision why the opinion was inconsistent with the evidence from the relevant timeframe. The court found no legal error.

Issue 3: Dr. Kearney's Neuropsychological Evaluation

Dr. Kearney completed a neuropsychological evaluation on March 3, 2022. He did not offer a specific opinion on work-related limitations, but the ALJ found his report consistent with moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace. The ALJ incorporated these into the RFC by limiting Mark M. to simple instructions and no specific production-rate pace.

Mark M. argued Dr. Kearney's evaluation was consistent with the marked limitations opined by Dr. Anderson. The court disagreed, finding Dr. Kearney's observations — which included average memory, borderline to average sustained concentration, and a capacity to learn and retain information — were more consistent with moderate limitations than marked limitations.

Issue 4: Whether the ALJ Met Listing 12.02 (Neurocognitive Disorders)

To meet Listing 12.02, a claimant must have marked limitations in at least two of four broad mental functioning areas (the "paragraph B" criteria), in addition to satisfying the paragraph A medical criteria. Mark M. argued he was markedly limited in three areas: understanding/remembering/applying information; interacting with others; and concentrating/persisting/maintaining pace. His argument rested on the court finding the ALJ had erred in evaluating Drs. Anderson's and Phillippi's opinions — which the court did not find.

The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Mark M. had only moderate limitations in understanding/remembering/applying information and in concentrating/persisting/maintaining pace, and no limitation in interacting with others. The court cited the ALJ's detailed summary of evidence including Mark M.'s self-reported abilities, his daily activities, and provider observations. The court concluded the ALJ did not err at step three.

Issue 5: Alleged Substitution of the ALJ's Medical Judgment

Mark M. argued the ALJ improperly substituted his own medical judgment for that of the treating and examining sources. The court rejected this, noting that evaluating a medical opinion for persuasiveness is both permitted and required under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. Declining to adopt limitations from a not-persuasive opinion is not the same as substituting the ALJ's own medical judgment.

The court also rejected the argument that the ALJ relied improperly on physician observations and Mark M.'s own statements rather than objective testing, noting that physician observations and claimant statements are acceptable forms of evidence under the regulations. The court observed that Mark M. was essentially asking the court to reweigh the evidence, which it may not do.

The court noted that the ALJ acknowledged the limitation of the state agency consultants' reviews (they only reviewed records pertaining to depression, not the neurocognitive disorder), but found the ALJ handled this appropriately by acknowledging it in the written decision.

Issue 6: Vocational Expert Testimony vs. Occupational Requirements Survey Data

At step five, the ALJ relied on a vocational expert (VE) who testified that Mark M. could work as a housekeeper/cleaner (190,500 positions), hand bander (2,000 positions), or power-screwdriver operator (264,000 positions). The VE used software called SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro, which distills Standard Occupational Classification jobs into Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) categories.

Mark M.'s counsel submitted a post-hearing brief arguing that Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Requirements Survey (ORS) data showed the housekeeper/cleaner job required standing for 95.7% of the workday and the power-screwdriver operator job required standing for 84.2% of the workday — amounts exceeding the 6-hour standing/walking limit for light work.

The ALJ rejected the ORS data for three reasons: (1) the DOT classified both jobs as light work, consistent with the VE's testimony; (2) subtracting 60 minutes of break time (two 15-minute breaks and a 30-minute lunch) left the time-on-feet figures roughly consistent with light work; and (3) accepting Mark M.'s argument would mean the jobs exceeded even heavy work, inconsistent with the DOT.

The court addressed each of the ALJ's rationales. It agreed with the first rationale, noting that under the newly promulgated SSR 24-3p, ALJs are no longer required to resolve conflicts between VE evidence and the DOT or other occupational data sources, and that no rule required the ALJ to credit ORS data over the VE. On the second rationale (break time subtraction), the court acknowledged Mark M.'s argument that breaks are not guaranteed and the Commissioner did not respond, but found that even if the ALJ erred on this point, the other rationales were sufficient.

The court also addressed Mark M.'s supplemental authority, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Powley v. Bisignano, 169 F.4th 1158 (9th Cir. 2026), which held that an ALJ must address and resolve significant and probative counter-evidence on job numbers. The court found Powley unpersuasive for three reasons: the ORS data for the power-screwdriver operator job covered the broader category "Assemblers and Fabricators, All Other," not specifically power-screwdriver operators; Mark M. provided no actual job-number counter-data; and Mark M. did not show his attorney replicated the VE's methodology or had expertise in calculating job numbers. The court also noted that the ORS data itself showed the 25th percentile of housekeepers/cleaners spent only 5.6 hours standing in an 8-hour day — within the light-work limit — and that 25% of 190,500 positions (approximately 47,625 jobs) could itself be a significant number.

Disposition

Judge Docherty denied the relief requested in Mark M.'s briefs, granted the relief requested in the Commissioner's brief, and affirmed the Commissioner's final decision.