Moss v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Cecil H. Moss sued the City and County of San Francisco under California’s Fair Housing and Employment Act, alleging disability discrimination. After a five-day trial, the jury found that the City failed to provide reasonable accommodation for Moss’s disability and failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process. The jury awarded Moss $255,116 in lost wages, and the court entered judgment for that amount on January 28, 2025.

The City moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or alternatively for a new trial. Moss moved to amend the judgment to correct a damages calculation, add prejudgment interest, and add post-judgment interest.

City’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

A Rule 50(b) motion asks the court to overturn a jury verdict when the evidence permits only one conclusion and that conclusion conflicts with the verdict. The court must view the evidence favorably to the party who won at trial and may not reweigh evidence or decide witness credibility.

For the failure-to-accommodate claim, the City argued Moss did not prove that he was qualified for a vacant position in which he could be accommodated. The court rejected the argument. The City had not raised its minimum-qualifications argument for the School Crossing Guard position in its earlier trial motion, and the verdict was based on that position. In addition, testimony from a City reasonable-accommodation coordinator supported a finding that Moss met the position’s minimum qualifications. Other evidence supported a finding that he could perform the position’s essential functions. The court therefore denied judgment as a matter of law on that claim.

For the interactive-process claim, the City argued Moss was responsible for the breakdown in the process. The court held that this argument was not properly raised in the City’s earlier trial motion. The court also stated that, even if the argument had been preserved, disputes in the evidence could allow a jury to find that the City was responsible. The court cited evidence about Moss’s participation in meetings, his efforts to increase his lifting capacity, the City’s failure to contact him about the School Crossing Guard position, and conflicting testimony about whether he asked for help obtaining employment verification. The court denied judgment as a matter of law on this claim as well.

City’s Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur

The City argued that both verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence. The court denied this request because the City did not provide factual or legal analysis explaining why its arguments satisfied the different standard for a new trial.

The City also argued that the court improperly prevented it from impeaching Moss’s testimony about his injury. The court had allowed Moss to provide limited information about the injury, surgery, and rehabilitation for context, but had excluded details about the cause of the injury and the quality of his medical care. The court concluded that the City failed to show substantial prejudice from the limitation, particularly because the parties had stipulated that Moss had a physical disability and that the City knew about it. The court denied a new trial on this ground.

The City challenged the admission of medical reports and related testimony concerning Moss’s medical restrictions and his ability to perform the Parking Control Officer position. The court did not decide whether those materials were admissible because, even assuming an error, the City had not shown substantial prejudice. The evidence concerned the Parking Control Officer position, while the jury’s verdict was based on the School Crossing Guard position. The court denied a new trial on this ground.

Finally, the City sought a new trial on damages or a reduction of the damages award. The court explained that the City had the burden to prove that comparable employment was available and that Moss could have obtained it through reasonable efforts. Because the City did not identify evidence establishing the amount Moss could have earned elsewhere, the court declined to disturb the jury’s award and denied the request for a new trial or remittitur.

Moss’s Motion to Amend the Judgment

Moss stated that the original $255,116 award included one extra month of School Crossing Guard wages and asked the court to reduce the award by $4,500. The City did not dispute the corrected amount. The court granted this part of Moss’s motion and amended the judgment to award $250,616 in past lost wages.

The court denied Moss’s request for $46,085.45 in prejudgment interest. Under California law, prejudgment interest is available when damages are certain or can be made certain by calculation. Here, the amount of damages depended on disputed factual questions about which positions Moss was qualified to perform. Because the possible positions had different wage amounts, the court concluded that the damages were not sufficiently certain before judgment.

The court granted Moss’s request for post-judgment interest. Federal law makes post-judgment interest mandatory on money judgments in civil cases in federal district court. The court awarded interest at $28.77 per day from January 28, 2025, until the City pays the judgment.

Disposition

The court denied the City’s request for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial. It granted in part and denied in part Moss’s motion to amend the judgment, reducing the award to $250,616, denying prejudgment interest, and adding post-judgment interest of $28.77 per day.