Thomas v. Banks

Background

Martine Thomas and Scott Thomas sued the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and Melissa Aviles-Ramos, in her official capacity as DOE Chancellor. They alleged that the defendants violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by failing to comply with an impartial hearing officer’s order concerning their son, A.T.’s, transportation.

A.T. was described as a sixteen-year-old child with Dandy-Walker syndrome, severe cognitive, motor, and sensory impairments, and no verbal or independent walking ability. After disagreeing with the DOE’s proposed public-school placement, the Thomases unilaterally placed A.T. at the International Institute for the Brain (iBrain). They contracted with Sisters Travel and Transportation Services, LLC, for transportation during the 2022–2023 school year. The contract charged a flat rate of $273 for each morning and afternoon trip and stated that the charges were based on school days whether the student used the service or not.

The impartial hearing officer found that the DOE had not provided A.T. with a free and appropriate public education, that iBrain was an appropriate unilateral placement, and that the Thomases were entitled to tuition reimbursement. The hearing officer also ordered the DOE to fund “the costs of transporting [A.T.] to and from [iBrain]” during the 2022–2023 school year. The DOE did not pay Sisters Travel’s invoices, and the opinion stated that the outstanding balance was $90,090.

The only remaining dispute concerned the scope of the DOE’s transportation obligation: whether it had to reimburse the full annual transportation contract or only transportation for days when A.T. attended iBrain in person. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which in an IDEA case function as review of the administrative decision rather than ordinary summary judgment alone.

IDEA Transportation Requirement

The court held that the IDEA requires transportation that adequately allows a child with a disability to benefit from special education, but the statute does not specify that transportation must always be funded through a flat annual contract regardless of actual use. The court stated that the DOE would have to fund the Sisters Travel arrangement if it was consistent with industry norms and the Thomases had no meaningful choice but to accept payment terms covering unused services. But if adequate transportation could be provided through a per-ride arrangement, that alternative could also satisfy the IDEA.

The court concluded that resolving this issue required factual findings about whether A.T. could obtain adequate transportation through per-ride payment or whether the New York City market was effectively limited to flat-fee arrangements. The court remanded this issue to the impartial hearing officer because that officer was better positioned to conduct the fact-finding and address related educational-policy questions.

Meaning of the Hearing Officer’s Order

The court separately considered whether the hearing officer’s language requiring transportation “to and from” iBrain already required payment of the entire annual Sisters Travel contract. It found the language ambiguous. The phrase could mean that the DOE had to fund an annual contract if that was the appropriate way to provide transportation, but it could also mean that the DOE had to pay only for transportation that physically took A.T. to and from iBrain.

The court distinguished an earlier case involving transportation payments during pandemic-related school closures. In that case, the order required specialized transportation for a stated period and did not limit payment based on actual transportation use. Here, by contrast, the hearing officer used the narrower phrase “to and from” iBrain, and the DOE had not agreed to pay regardless of whether A.T. used the service.

Disposition

The court denied the Thomases’ motion for summary judgment. It granted the defendants’ motion in part insofar as they moved for a remand. The case was remanded to impartial hearing officer Natasha Pierre for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including clarification of what transportation funding the hearing officer’s order required and, if necessary, what attendance information would be needed. The court denied as moot the Thomases’ request to make a later motion for costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motions and close the case.