Guillory v. Contra Costa County

Background

Pro se plaintiff Andrew Samuel Guillory sued his parole officer, Carlos De Jesus, the Division of Adult Parole Operations, and the Hope Program. The opinion explains that the Division is part of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The pleadings also referred to “Contra Costa County Parole,” which the court described as a field office within that state department. Guillory challenged a parole condition requiring him to participate in the Hope Program’s sex-offender treatment program twice a week. He said he had been told that his parole would be revoked if he did not participate.

Guillory argued that the condition violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment because it required him to disclose what he called a juvenile adjudication in front of people he described as convicted child molesters. He also referred to privacy and harassment concerns and cited federal and California laws concerning juvenile records. The court said it was unclear whether those privacy arguments were separate statutory claims or part of his Eighth Amendment claim, but found that he had not provided supporting legal authority.

The Hope Program did not respond to the preliminary-injunction request or enter an appearance. The clerk entered a notice of default against it. The court accepted Guillory’s amended request as the operative request for preliminary relief.

Legal standard

A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order requires a plaintiff to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of equities favors an injunction, and that an injunction would serve the public interest.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that Guillory had not shown a likelihood of success. First, it held that De Jesus was protected by absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from claims arising from the imposition of parole conditions. Second, it held that the Division of Adult Parole Operations was immune under the Eleventh Amendment because it is part of a state agency. The court also stated that claims against the local parole office were effectively claims against the State of California because the office is a field office of the state department.

The court separately considered the substance of Guillory’s Eighth Amendment argument. It explained that California law authorizes parole authorities to impose parole conditions and that California Penal Code section 290 requires participation in a sex-offender treatment program for people subject to that requirement. The court found that the record showed Guillory had been convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and had at least one attempted-rape conviction from 1995. It found that Guillory had not shown why he was exempt from the treatment requirement and had not shown that the parole condition was unreasonable or rose to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.

The court also found that Guillory had not demonstrated irreparable harm. Although he asserted that the program would cause emotional and reputational harm and require him to revisit juvenile offenses, the court viewed those consequences as arising from a treatment program in which he appeared lawfully enrolled as a parole condition. The court further found that enjoining enforcement could cause irreparable harm to California and its parole system, and that the public-interest and balance-of-equities factors weighed against an injunction.

Disposition

Judge William H. Orrick denied Guillory’s request for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The order addressed only the request for preliminary relief; the opinion does not state that the underlying lawsuit was dismissed or otherwise finally resolved.