Knight v. Richardson Bay Regional Agency

Background

Daniel Knight moved for a temporary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to prevent the Richardson Bay Regional Agency (RBRA), its harbormaster, and its executive director from seizing his boat, the Coronado, and its anchor system. The RBRA had posted a notice stating that the boat would be removed and disposed of within ten days because it qualified as “marine debris” under California Harbors and Navigation Code sections 550 and 551.

Knight said he had lived on the boat for 25 years, that it was seaworthy and had a functional engine, and that he had nowhere else to live. The RBRA disputed that he lived on the boat and asserted that it had been largely stationary, contained substantial debris, and had been uninhabited since at least October 2021. The parties also disputed whether the boat qualified as marine debris and whether Knight had sought to participate in the RBRA’s boat buy-back program.

Knight’s complaint asserted several federal and state claims, including claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the California Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The claims included alleged unreasonable seizure, deprivation of property without due process, a state-created-danger theory, an unconstitutional taking, fraud, extortion, conspiracy, and hijacking-related claims.

Temporary restraining order

A temporary restraining order is short-term relief intended to preserve the existing situation and prevent irreparable harm until a hearing can occur. The court applied the same general factors used for a preliminary injunction: whether the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of hardships and public interest favor relief.

The court found serious questions concerning three claims. First, Knight plausibly alleged that the RBRA might be acting outside its authority if the Coronado did not meet the legal definition of marine debris. The court stated that intentionally seizing a vessel outside the agency’s authority could support a substantive due process claim, although the court did not decide whether that theory would ultimately prevail.

Second, the court concluded that towing away the boat could constitute a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment if it was Knight’s home. The RBRA did not adequately address why the seizure would be reasonable, and it did not dispute Knight’s allegations that he was not given a hearing or a copy of the survey used to classify the boat as marine debris.

Third, the court found serious questions about Knight’s Fifth Amendment takings claim. Although the RBRA had offered a buy-back program, Knight asserted that he would have to return the compensation if accepting it made him homeless. The court said that conditioning compensation on avoiding homelessness—a consequence that might result from the government’s own action—could conflict with the requirement to provide just compensation.

The court did not find sufficient support at this preliminary stage for Knight’s state-created-danger claim, mail- and wire-fraud claims, extortion claim, conspiracy-to-commit-hijacking claim, or Administrative Procedure Act claim. The court therefore did not say that those claims presented serious questions on the current record.

Irreparable harm and balance of hardships

The court found that the alleged constitutional violations could themselves constitute irreparable harm. It also found that Knight might suffer serious harm to his health and safety if he were evicted from the boat and could not obtain other housing. The RBRA had not shown that delaying the seizure briefly would cause comparable irreparable harm. Although environmental protection could support the agency’s position, the RBRA had not shown at that stage that the boat was causing environmental harm or that immediate seizure was necessary.

Rulings and next steps

Judge William H. Orrick granted Knight’s motion for a temporary restraining order. The order preserved the status quo and barred the defendants from seizing the Coronado and its anchor system while the matter proceeded toward a preliminary-injunction hearing. The parties were ordered to conduct expedited discovery and exchange initial disclosures. Knight was required to file an expanded preliminary-injunction motion by November 23, 2022; the defendants’ opposition was due December 12, 2022; and Knight’s reply was due December 19, 2022, with a hearing set for January 4, 2023.

The court also granted Knight’s motion to proceed without prepaying filing fees and directed service of process on the three defendants who had appeared. The court declined to appoint counsel at that time and referred Knight to the court’s Legal Help Center. The court granted Knight’s request for proceedings by videoconference and referred the parties to mediation.