Tavantzis v. American Airlines, Inc.

Background

Ana Maria Marcela Tavantzis and her husband, Jesus Plasencia, traveled from San Francisco to Madrid on an American Airlines flight with a layover in Miami. Before takeoff, Plasencia suddenly could not pick up his phone and began speaking gibberish. Tavantzis told a flight attendant that she believed he was having a stroke. The pilot spoke with the plaintiffs and cleared them to fly. No American employee contacted the airline’s medical response team or sought help from medically trained passengers before takeoff.

During the flight, Plasencia suffered a left middle cerebral artery stroke. The pilot requested medical assistance from passengers, and medical personnel treated Plasencia. The pilot continued to Madrid, where Plasencia was taken to a hospital and later remained hospitalized for 23 days.

The plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint asserted two claims under the Montreal Convention and a Texas breach-of-contract claim. American moved for judgment on the pleadings on the contract claim. American also moved under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the standard associated with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to exclude the opinions of the plaintiffs’ aviation expert, Retired Captain Richard J. Levy.

Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is functionally like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asks whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court held that the Texas contract claim was preempted by the Montreal Convention. The Convention was the exclusive source of any remedy for an injury arising from international air transportation. The plaintiffs’ contract theory was based on provisions in American’s Conditions of Carriage and Tariff No. AA1 that mirrored or incorporated Article 28 of the Montreal Convention, which concerns advance payments for injury. The court concluded that the contract claim remained within the Convention’s substantive scope and was inseparably connected to Plasencia’s injury during the flight. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that American’s alleged post-flight failure to address their grievances placed the claim outside the Convention.

The court granted American’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The conclusion states that the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim, Claim III, was dismissed with prejudice.

Expert Testimony

The court found that Levy’s opinions were reliable and would assist the jury. American conceded that Levy was qualified as an aviation expert, and the court rejected American’s arguments that his experience-based opinions were unreliable because his report did not precisely define his assignment or cite the record in the manner American requested. The court also found the flight data Levy used reliable. The fact that the third-party website later no longer had the data did not require exclusion because the data Levy relied on had been provided to American, and American had previously had access to the public data.

The court also rejected American’s argument that Levy improperly addressed ultimate issues. Under the evidence rules, an expert may give an opinion that bears on an ultimate factual issue, but may not give a legal conclusion. The court found that Levy did not opine on legal issues. Arguments concerning the factual basis and credibility of his opinions went to their weight and could be addressed through cross-examination and contrary evidence rather than exclusion.

The court agreed, however, that Levy exceeded the scope of his expertise when discussing the conduct of flight attendants and other American employees who were not the pilot. Levy’s experience was as a pilot, not a flight attendant, so he was not qualified to testify about whether those employees violated policy or acted negligently. The court struck all portions of his testimony that addressed the behavior, conduct, or propriety of any American employee other than the pilot.

Disposition

The court granted American’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim was dismissed with prejudice. The court granted in part and denied in part American’s motion to exclude Levy’s testimony. Except for the portions concerning non-pilot American employees that were stricken, Levy’s opinions and testimony were admissible.