Huerta v. First Solar, Inc., a Delaware corporation
- Beth Freeman
- 5:18-cv-06761
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 22
In Huerta v. CSI, Judge Freeman granted in part and denied in part CSI’s motion, granting judgment on three claims and denying it on one wage claim.
George Huerta and CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc. CSI obtained judgment on the Exit Badge Out Claim and the wage-statement and waiting-time penalty claims, while Huerta’s Section 5(A) travel-time claim was not resolved in CSI’s favor by this order.
What happened
George Huerta sued CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc. over whether workers at a solar project were owed pay for travel, security-gate delays, and meal periods under California law. After an earlier appeal, three wage-related issues and related penalty claims returned to the district court.
CSI asked for summary judgment on travel time between the security gate and parking lots, time spent badging out, and penalties for wage statements and late-paid wages. The court found disputed facts about why workers had to report to the security gate, so that travel-time claim could proceed. It found that CSI had paid Huerta through badging out and that CSI had an objectively reasonable basis for disputing the other wage claims, so it granted judgment on the badge-out and penalty claims.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman granted in part and denied in part CSI’s motion for partial summary judgment. The ruling granted the motion as to the Exit Badge Out Claim and the claims for wage-statement and waiting-time penalties, and denied it as to the Section 5(A) travel-time claim. The motion did not address the unpaid-meal-period claim or several other causes of action.
The detailed version
- Huerta v. First Solar, Inc., a Delaware corporation · No. 5:18-cv-06761
- Beth Freeman
- May 14, 2025
Background
This wage-and-hour class action arose from the California Flats Solar Project. First Solar, Inc. owned the project and retained CSI Electrical Contractors, Inc. to perform work there. CSI also arranged for Milco National Constructors to assign workers to assist CSI. Huerta was one of those Milco employees and worked at the project for approximately one month.
Workers traveled by personal vehicle through a project entrance and then several miles to the Phase 2 Security Gate, where guards scanned their badges. They then drove another 10 or 15 minutes to employee parking lots. At the end of the day, workers badged out at the same gate, and backups sometimes made that process take as much as 20 minutes.
Huerta alleged that travel on the access road, time waiting to badge in and out, and unpaid meal periods were compensable work time under California law and Wage Order 16. His operative complaint also asserted claims for inaccurate wage statements, waiting-time penalties, mileage reimbursement, unfair competition, and civil penalties under California’s Private Attorneys General Act.
Procedural History
The court had previously granted CSI summary judgment on various issues. After the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to answer state-law questions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the earlier rulings, then sent the case back for further proceedings.
The appeal revived three wage issues: travel time between the Phase 2 Security Gate and the employee parking lots, unpaid meal periods, and time spent badging out through the gate. It also revived the claims for wage-statement penalties, waiting-time penalties, mileage reimbursement, unfair competition, and PAGA penalties because those claims had been treated as derivative of the wage claims.
CSI’s current motion sought partial summary judgment only on the Section 5(A) travel-time claim, the Exit Badge Out Claim, and the wage-statement and waiting-time penalty claims. The motion did not address the Controlled Meal Period Wage Claim, the mileage-reimbursement claim, the unfair-competition claim, or the PAGA claim.
Section 5(A) Travel-Time Claim
Wage Order 16, section 5(A), requires payment for employer-mandated travel occurring after the first location where the employer requires the employee’s presence. The California Supreme Court explained that the employee’s presence at that first location must be required for an employment-related reason other than merely making it practically possible to reach the worksite.
CSI argued that the Phase 2 Security Gate served only a security purpose and that security at an access point could not qualify as a separate employment-related reason. The court rejected that legal argument. It held that worksite security could potentially be an employment-related reason under section 5(A), particularly because the California Supreme Court had identified the project’s security protocols as potentially relevant.
CSI presented evidence that security was the reason workers had to report to the gate. Huerta presented evidence that the badging system also served accountability and emergency-related purposes, including identifying who was on the project and reporting individuals who had Valley Fever. Because the evidence created a factual dispute about why CSI required workers’ presence at the gate, CSI did not establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
The court therefore denied CSI’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Section 5(A) claim concerning travel between the Phase 2 Security Gate and the employee parking lots.
Exit Badge Out Claim
CSI did not dispute that Huerta was entitled to pay for time spent waiting to badge out and badging out through the Phase 2 Security Gate. CSI argued that it had paid him for that time. CSI presented a side agreement requiring payment through the end-of-day badge-out process and evidence from its expert, Keith Mendes, who reviewed timesheets and badge records.
Mendes concluded that Huerta had been paid through badge-out for 11 shifts for which the relevant records were available, and that Huerta had been paid more than the hours worked by 6.67 hours. Mendes also reviewed records for 183 other CSI employees during the relevant four-month period and concluded that they were paid through badge-out.
Huerta did not submit a declaration or other affirmative evidence identifying shifts for which he had not been paid for badge-out time. The court held that CSI’s evidence was sufficient to meet its initial summary-judgment burden and that Huerta had not shown a genuine factual dispute.
The court therefore granted CSI’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Exit Badge Out Claim.
Wage-Statement and Waiting-Time Penalties
Huerta’s wage-statement penalty claim arose under California Labor Code section 226, and his waiting-time penalty claim arose under section 203. CSI argued that it could not be liable for those penalties because it had an objectively reasonable, good-faith basis for disputing whether the wages were owed.
The court agreed. It relied in part on the earlier procedural history: the court had previously ruled for CSI, and the Ninth Circuit had certified the relevant state-law issues to the California Supreme Court because controlling state law was lacking. The court concluded that this history showed CSI’s position was objectively reasonable.
Huerta did not present evidence showing that the law was clear against CSI’s position or that CSI acted with subjective bad faith. The court therefore granted CSI’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action for wage-statement penalties and the Third Cause of Action for waiting-time penalties.
Evidentiary Rulings and Disposition
The court overruled most of Huerta’s objections to declarations submitted by CSI witnesses and expert Keith Mendes. It sustained objections to certain statements by Jake McGinley about whether Huerta and other employees were actually paid, finding that McGinley had not shown personal knowledge of the underlying payment records. The court nevertheless considered Mendes’s opinions and found them admissible for purposes of the motion.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered that CSI’s motion for partial summary judgment be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART: granted as to the Exit Badge Out Claim, the wage-statement penalty claim, and the waiting-time penalty claim; and denied as to the Section 5(A) travel-time claim. The order terminated ECF 201.
Read the full 22-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.