Mussa v. International

Background

Mukhtar Mussa, a Black man born in Eritrea, began working for Honeywell International, Inc. in August 2013 and was promoted to a group leader position in late 2021 or early 2022. Beginning in April 2023, two of his supervisors issued him a Letter of Expectation requiring him to become fully trained on all operations on the 1320 product line. Mussa objected, believing group leaders were not required to know all operator jobs on the assembly line. A second Letter of Expectation followed in August 2023 with a stated completion deadline.

Mussa filed a grievance with his union contesting the training requirement and asserting the letters were issued based on bias. The union denied the grievance in December 2023. In January 2024, Honeywell notified Mussa that he had refused to take work direction from his supervisor. A further Letter of Expectation in February 2024 cited inappropriate behavior including refusing to schedule another group leader for overtime shifts because he was upset with her. In April 2024, Honeywell terminated Mussa, citing his continued failure to complete the 1320 line training as unacceptable conduct in violation of company policies.

Mussa initiated this case in Minnesota state court in May 2024, alleging violations of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Honeywell removed the case to federal court in June 2024. Honeywell moved for summary judgment on January 5, 2026. Mussa did not timely respond, and the court extended the deadline to March 25, 2026. Mussa filed his opposition on that date and filed three affidavits from former Honeywell employees — Darnell Williams, Donny Lee, and Abdiwahab Mohamed Nur — the following day.

Admissibility of Late-Filed Affidavits

Honeywell objected to the three affidavits under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37, arguing Mussa failed to properly disclose these witnesses during discovery. Rule 26(a) requires parties to disclose individuals likely to have discoverable information they may use to support their claims; Rule 37(c)(1) is the automatic sanction for non-compliance, barring use of undisclosed witnesses unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.

The court found that Mussa had disclosed one witness (Williams) only for limited purposes and had not disclosed the other two (Lee and Nur) at all, constituting a violation of Rule 26. However, the court declined to exclude the affidavits because it concluded their admission was harmless: Honeywell was entitled to summary judgment on all three counts even when the affidavits were considered. The court therefore did not exclude them.

Count One: Minnesota Whistleblower Act — Retaliation

The MWA prohibits employer retaliation against an employee who, in good faith, reports a violation of any federal or state law. Because Mussa presented no direct evidence of retaliation, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework (a three-step analytical structure under which a plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case, then the employer must articulate a legitimate reason, and finally the plaintiff must show that reason is pretextual).

The first element of a prima facie MWA retaliation claim requires the employee to have engaged in statutorily protected conduct — specifically, reporting facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law. Mussa argued that his report about coworker Ruby Vuong's conduct was protected. However, his complaint described only that Vuong's conduct violated company policy, not any state or federal law or rule. Neither his complaint nor his opposition memorandum cited any law that Vuong's conduct would have violated.

The court held that Mussa failed to establish the first essential element of a prima facie retaliation case. Because this failure was dispositive, the court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on Count One without reaching the remaining elements.

Count Two: Minnesota Human Rights Act — Reprisal

The MHRA prohibits employers from engaging in reprisal against an employee for opposing a practice forbidden under the MHRA or for participating in an MHRA investigation. The same McDonnell Douglas framework applies. The court noted that claims of discriminatory practices under the MWA are preempted by the MHRA's exclusivity provision, so reports of discrimination were analyzed only under the MHRA.

Assuming without deciding that Mussa had established a prima facie case of reprisal, the court found that Honeywell had articulated a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for termination: Mussa's persistent refusal to complete the required 1320 line training despite nearly a year of notice and multiple warnings. The burden then shifted to Mussa to demonstrate that this reason was pretextual (i.e., that the stated reason was not the true reason for the termination).

The court found that Mussa's opposition memorandum did not address the pretext element at all. The court reiterated that it would not independently search the record for factual disputes on elements that the opposing party had not briefed. Because Mussa presented no evidence of pretext, the court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on Count Two.

Count Three: Minnesota Human Rights Act — Racial Discrimination

The MHRA prohibits employers from discharging an employee because of race. Mussa, who is Black, brought this claim under a disparate treatment theory. Again applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the court required Mussa to establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) membership in a protected class, (2) meeting Honeywell's legitimate expectations, (3) suffering an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

The court focused on the fourth element. Mussa argued that the three affidavits — particularly the Lee affidavit, which stated that other group leaders were not required to complete the 1320 line training — showed more favorable treatment of similarly situated non-Black employees. However, the court applied the rigorous standard for comparator evidence: the proposed comparators must have dealt with the same supervisor, been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.

The court found that Mussa presented no evidence that any non-Black employee shared his same supervisors, was subject to the same standards, and was assigned the same training but refused to complete it without being terminated. Because Mussa failed to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case, the court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on Count Three.

Disposition

The court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment in full on all three counts and dismissed Mussa's complaint in its entirety with prejudice.