D.F. v. New York City Department of Education
- Lewis Liman
- 1:24-cv-03087
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 27
In D.F. v. New York City Department of Education, Judge Liman granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss claims involving A.F.’s special-education services.
D.F. and her child, A.F., may continue litigating the Section 504 claim and specified portions of the Section 1983 claim; the remaining Section 1983 theories were dismissed through the partial ruling on the motion.
What happened
In D.F. v. New York City Department of Education, D.F. sued the New York City Department of Education and related defendants on behalf of herself and her child, A.F., alleging violations involving A.F.’s special-education services. The claims arose from allegations that the defendants failed to provide required educational and therapy services, follow hearing-officer orders, and maintain services required while disputes were pending.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss D.F.’s claims under federal rules governing lack of jurisdiction and legally insufficient claims. The court held that some claims had been properly pursued through administrative hearings, while others were excused from that process because they concerned pending services or an alleged policy of not offering one-to-one instruction or applied behavioral analysis in individualized education programs. The court also found that the allegations plausibly supported a disability-discrimination claim and part of a civil-rights claim.
Judge Lewis J. Liman granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The civil-rights claim could proceed insofar as it sought enforcement of hearing-officer orders or challenged the alleged policy concerning one-to-one instruction and applied behavioral analysis; the motion was otherwise granted as to that claim. The court reserved the defendants’ request for separate stages of discovery.
The detailed version
- D.F. v. New York City Department of Education · No. 1:24-cv-03087
- Lewis Liman
- May 16, 2025
Background
D.F. brought the action individually and as parent and natural guardian of A.F. against the New York City Department of Education, the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, David C. Banks in his official capacity as Chancellor, and the City of New York. The amended complaint asserted claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Section 1983, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
A.F. was diagnosed with autism. The complaint alleged that, over several school years, the Department of Education failed to provide or implement services including one-to-one instruction, applied behavioral analysis, speech and language therapy, feeding therapy, assistive technology, and other services. It also alleged that the Department failed to comply with orders issued by impartial hearing officers and with “pendency” requirements, which are intended to keep required educational services in place while a dispute is being resolved.
Impartial hearing officers found that A.F. had been denied a free appropriate public education for several school years and ordered services, evaluations, and compensatory education. The defendants did not appeal those decisions. D.F. later filed this federal action, and the defendants moved to dismiss the Section 1983 and Section 504 claims.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
The court first addressed whether D.F. had to pursue claims through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s administrative process before bringing them in federal court. The court held that D.F. had exhausted the claims raised in administrative complaints concerning the 2017–2023 school years on which she prevailed. However, to the extent hearing officers denied requests for relief and D.F. did not allege that she appealed those denials, she had not exhausted those claims.
The court also held that exhaustion was not required for claims alleging violations of pendency requirements. It further held that the complaint adequately alleged an agency-wide practice of not offering applied behavioral analysis and one-to-one instruction in students’ individualized education programs unless those services were obtained through litigation. That alleged policy qualified for an exception to exhaustion. The court did not find adequate factual support for alleged policies concerning after-school services or home-based special education and related services.
Claims concerning the 2023–2024 school year were not resolved through the same exhaustion ruling because the opinion stated that D.F. did not say whether the assigned hearing officer had ruled on that complaint. The court concluded that federal jurisdiction was appropriate for the exhausted or excused claims, but that D.F. otherwise had to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking federal review.
Section 504 claim
Section 504 prohibits disability discrimination by programs receiving federal financial assistance. The court explained that a Section 504 claim requires more than showing that a school district violated the education statute. The plaintiff must plausibly allege discrimination involving bad faith, gross misjudgment, or deliberate indifference to the student’s rights.
The court found that D.F.’s allegations met that pleading standard. The complaint described repeated findings that A.F. had been denied a free appropriate public education, repeated notice to the defendants about the problems, failures to implement hearing-officer and pendency orders, termination or underprovision of services, and continued failures to correct the alleged deficiencies. Those allegations supported a plausible inference that the defendants acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment. The court therefore did not dismiss the Section 504 claim at this stage.
Section 1983 claim
Section 1983 provides a way to seek relief for violations of federal rights committed under state law. The court held that a Section 1983 claim could be based on the alleged deprivation of rights created by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act when the claim involved a systemic violation that the administrative process could not address.
The court found sufficient allegations that the Department of Education had a policy of refusing to offer one-to-one instruction or applied behavioral analysis in students’ individualized education programs unless those services were ordered through litigation. Those allegations supported the Section 1983 claim. The court also held that it had authority to enforce favorable impartial-hearing-officer orders under Section 1983, so the claim could proceed insofar as it sought enforcement of those orders.
The court rejected the allegations that the defendants had failed to train or supervise employees as too conclusory. It therefore granted the motion as to the Section 1983 claim to the extent it was based on theories other than enforcement of the hearing-officer orders or the alleged policy concerning one-to-one instruction and applied behavioral analysis.
Ruling
Judge Lewis J. Liman ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint was granted in part and denied in part. The court denied the motion as to the Section 504 claim and denied it as to the Section 1983 claim insofar as that claim was based on enforcement of the impartial-hearing-officer orders or the alleged policy of not offering one-to-one instruction or applied behavioral analysis in individualized education programs. The motion was otherwise granted as to the Section 1983 claim. The court reserved the defendants’ request for bifurcated discovery pending a proposed case-management plan and a status conference.
Read the full 27-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.