Maki v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Background

The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis required its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they received a medical or religious accommodation. Rodney Maki, a Bank law enforcement officer, requested a religious accommodation because he objected to vaccines linked to fetal cell lines resulting from abortions. The Bank temporarily granted the accommodation but later revoked it. After Maki remained unvaccinated, the Bank placed him on leave and terminated his employment on January 21, 2022.

Maki sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging religious discrimination. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and both sides moved to exclude expert testimony.

Expert-Testimony Motions

The court denied Maki’s request to exclude the Bank’s experts entirely. It found that the Bank’s medical expert, Dr. Frank Rhame, could assist the jury in evaluating scientific information about COVID-19, vaccines, transmission, and other safety measures. The court also found that the objections to vocational expert Jennifer Bey’s analysis—including objections to her factual basis and methods—were generally matters for cross-examination rather than grounds for excluding her testimony.

The court granted the Bank’s motion to exclude portions of Maki’s expert, Dr. Peter McCullough. Dr. McCullough could testify about the medical value and effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines, but he could not testify about what “ethical and prudent” employers should do, whether employers should grant vaccination exemptions, or whether employees should face pressure or reprisals for refusing vaccination. The court concluded those opinions went beyond his specialized medical expertise.

Title VII Claim

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating because of religion and requires reasonable accommodation of religious practices unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship. The court explained that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy, undue hardship requires substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of the employer’s particular business, considering all relevant circumstances.

For purposes of the Bank’s motion, the Bank conceded that a reasonable jury could find Maki had a sincere religious belief conflicting with the vaccination requirement. Maki informed the Bank of that belief, and his termination was an adverse employment action. The dispute therefore centered on whether accommodating him would have caused an undue hardship.

The court denied the Bank’s summary-judgment motion on the Title VII claim because genuine disputes of material fact remained. A reasonable jury could accept or reject the Bank’s arguments that Maki’s job required close contact with others, that exempting him would create health and safety risks, and that excusing him from certain duties would create operational difficulties. The record also contained evidence that some close-contact tasks occurred infrequently, that shift or post changes might have reduced contact, and that Maki was willing to undergo regular testing, wear a mask, and maintain physical distance.

The court also denied Maki’s motion for summary judgment. Although the Bank conceded for purposes of its own motion that a jury could find Maki’s belief sincere, it disputed sincerity for purposes of Maki’s motion. The Bank identified evidence including Maki’s prior adult vaccinations, statements about his parish’s position, his changing statements about receiving a vaccine without fetal-cell connections, his nonreligious reasons for initially avoiding vaccination, and the timing of his research and accommodation request. The court held that a reasonable jury could find either that Maki’s religious objection was sincere or that it was not.

RFRA Claim

The court granted the Bank’s summary-judgment motion on Maki’s RFRA claim. Controlling Eighth Circuit precedent held that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for religious-discrimination claims arising from federal employment and that RFRA was not intended to expand those remedies. The court determined that this precedent applied even though Maki brought his Title VII claim under the statute’s provisions concerning private employers and argued that the Federal Reserve Bank could be treated as a federal instrumentality for RFRA purposes.

The court therefore entered summary judgment against Maki on Count I, the RFRA claim. It did not grant the Bank summary judgment on Count II, the Title VII claim.

Order

The court ordered: