Carlson v. BNSF Railway Company

Background

Jason Carlson, a former BNSF conductor, reported that he was injured on August 11, 2017, when a train traveled over rough tracks at CP Diamond and the Hawley Detector in Minnesota. BNSF investigated whether Carlson had falsely reported a personal injury, found that he had violated Rule 1.6 of its General Code of Operating Rules, and terminated his employment on November 2, 2017. BNSF also identified a prior serious rule violation as an alternative basis for termination. A three-member Public Law Board later upheld the discipline.

Carlson brought three claims. Count I alleged that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act by retaliating against him for reporting unsafe working conditions. Count II alleged that BNSF’s negligence caused his injuries under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Count III alleged that BNSF used a locomotive that was not safe to operate, violating the Locomotive Inspection Act. BNSF sought summary judgment on all three claims, exclusion of Carlson’s engineering expert Brian Hansen’s opinions and testimony, and separation of the claims for trial.

Summary Judgment

Federal Rail Safety Act claim. The court granted summary judgment on Count I. Carlson relied on circumstantial evidence to show that his protected reports were a contributing factor in his termination. The court concluded that the timing of the termination, an internal email discussing possible rule violations, evidence concerning BNSF’s policies, and alleged hostility did not create a reasonable inference of intentional retaliation. The court emphasized that the record did not show shifting explanations, inconsistent application of the relevant dishonesty rule, or hostility by people shown to have made the termination decision.

Federal Employers’ Liability Act claim. The court denied summary judgment on Count II. BNSF argued that Carlson lacked evidence that the track near the Hawley Detector was rough or defective and argued that expert testimony was required. The court rejected that argument, explaining that expert testimony is not always required under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and that a jury may rely on reasonable conclusions from circumstantial evidence. Carlson’s testimony and contemporaneous reports, together with another employee’s testimony about experiencing side-to-side motion at the Hawley Detector because of the tracks, were enough to create a genuine dispute about whether BNSF’s negligence contributed to Carlson’s injuries.

Locomotive Inspection Act claim. The court denied summary judgment on Count III. It explained that the Locomotive Inspection Act does not provide an injured employee with a separate personal-injury cause of action. Instead, an alleged violation can serve as a theory of negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Carlson presented evidence that the locomotive had four traction motors instead of six and had thinner shocks than when manufactured. The court concluded that a jury could infer from this evidence that the locomotive was not in proper condition or safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.

Expert Testimony

The court denied BNSF’s motion to exclude Hansen’s opinions and testimony. Hansen offered opinions about BNSF’s inspection and maintenance of the tracks at CP Diamond and the Hawley Detector. BNSF challenged the reliability of his methodology, his opinions about the Hawley Detector, and his treatment of track resurfacing near CP Diamond.

The court found that Hansen reviewed injury reports, defect and inspection records, maintenance rules, industry manuals, and other materials, and applied his railway-engineering knowledge and experience. It concluded that BNSF’s criticisms primarily concerned the factual basis, weight, and credibility of Hansen’s opinions rather than their admissibility. The court also found that Hansen had considered the resurfacing at CP Diamond and disagreed with BNSF about what that resurfacing showed. Those disputes could be addressed through cross-examination and competing evidence.

Bifurcation and Disposition

BNSF’s motion to bifurcate, or separate, Count I from Counts II and III at trial was denied as moot because the court granted summary judgment on Count I.

The order expressly provides that BNSF’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part; BNSF’s motion to exclude expert testimony was denied; and BNSF’s motion to bifurcate was denied as moot. Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright signed the order.