Munoz v. Peets Coffee, Inc.

Background

Veronica Munoz, Jennifer Wilkinson, Katherine Hetherton, and Michelle Irwin sued Peet’s Coffee, Inc. They alleged that Peet’s discriminated against people with lactose intolerance and milk allergies by charging a surcharge to replace dairy milk with non-dairy alternatives in drinks.

The complaint asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Massachusetts’s Anti-Discrimination Law, and the Texas Human Resources Code. Plaintiffs also asserted unjust-enrichment claims under California, Massachusetts, and Texas law.

Judicial Notice

Peet’s asked the court to take judicial notice of screenshots from Peet’s and Tim Hortons websites and of a filing from another case. Judicial notice allows a court to accept certain facts that are not reasonably disputable without requiring proof.

The court denied judicial notice of the website materials. It concluded that the private websites were not inherently reliable for this purpose and that Peet’s was attempting to use the materials to dispute Plaintiffs’ allegations, which would improperly convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court took judicial notice of the existence of the filing from the other case, but not of the truth of the statements in that filing.

ADA Claims

Plaintiffs pursued two theories under the Americans with Disabilities Act: that Peet’s imposed an illegal surcharge under the Act’s regulations, and that Peet’s failed to make a reasonable modification by charging for non-dairy alternatives.

For the surcharge theory, the court applied a two-part test from Dare v. California. The court asked whether the policy was required to provide people with disabilities nondiscriminatory treatment and whether the fee was a surcharge—meaning a charge that nondisabled people would not have to pay. The court held that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged either factor.

The court also distinguished Phillips v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., on which Plaintiffs relied. In Phillips, the alleged separate gluten-free menu charged more for items that were exact counterparts of items on the regular menu. Here, the court found that the menu sections identified by Plaintiffs were customization sections listing additional costs for several kinds of customizations, not a separate menu directed only at people with lactose intolerance or milk allergies. The court therefore found that Plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged an illegal surcharge.

For the reasonable-modification theory, the court found that Plaintiffs had adequately alleged that they asked Peet’s to waive the extra cost for non-dairy alternatives. But the court held that Plaintiffs still had not adequately alleged that the requested modification was necessary. The court rejected the argument that the Americans with Disabilities Act required Peet’s to sell disability-accommodating goods at exactly the same price as their ordinary counterparts to provide a similar experience. The court therefore held that Plaintiffs had not stated a claim for failure to make reasonable modifications.

State Discrimination Claims

Munoz and Irwin asserted a claim under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. They relied on both an Americans with Disabilities Act theory and an intentional-discrimination theory. Because the court found that Plaintiffs had not stated an Americans with Disabilities Act claim, it considered only intentional discrimination.

The court held that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged the willful, affirmative misconduct and specific intent required for an intentional-discrimination claim under the Unruh Act. It found that Peet’s pricing policy was facially neutral and applied equally to customers who were not lactose intolerant but preferred non-dairy alternatives. The court also held that the customization section of the menu did not plausibly show an intent to target people with lactose intolerance or milk allergies.

Hetherton asserted a claim under Massachusetts Public Accommodation Law, and Wilkinson asserted a claim under the Texas Human Resources Code. The court explained that both provisions generally apply in line with the Americans with Disabilities Act and dismissed those claims for the same reasons it rejected Plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act claims.

Unjust-Enrichment Claims

Plaintiffs’ unjust-enrichment claims were based on the same allegations and theory as their Americans with Disabilities Act claims: that Peet’s improperly benefited from charging for non-dairy alternatives. The court held that because Peet’s pricing policy did not constitute a discriminatory surcharge under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Plaintiffs had not shown wrongful conduct making it unjust for Peet’s to retain the benefit from their purchases.

Disposition

The court granted Peet’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims without leave to amend, denied all other pending motions as moot, directed the clerk to enter judgment on behalf of Peet’s, and closed the case.