Avery v. Darci J. Bentz

Background

Reuben Lopez Avery filed this federal lawsuit seeking to challenge, and largely undo, rulings issued in two ongoing Jackson County, Minnesota state-court proceedings: (1) a criminal case arising from his November 2024 arrest and subsequent guilty plea to second-degree assault, for which he was sentenced to 15 months in prison — stayed for two years — and two years of supervised probation running through January 24, 2027; and (2) a marital-dissolution (divorce and custody) case that was pending at the time of his arrest and remains pending.

Avery had previously brought a similar federal lawsuit against most of the same defendants in November 2025, which was dismissed without prejudice by then-Chief Judge Patrick J. Schiltz on grounds including the Younger abstention doctrine, the Heck bar on civil-rights damages tied to an intact conviction, and the rule that attacks on a criminal conviction must proceed through a habeas corpus petition rather than a civil-rights suit. The present action renewed those theories, added new defendants, and added allegations about events occurring after late 2025.

Defendants

The amended complaint named: Judge Darci J. Bentz (presiding judge in the dissolution case); Kayla McKenney (court administrator); Judge Steven R. Schwab (retired senior judge who presided over some dissolution proceedings); Judge Sherry E. Haley (judge who ruled on certain objections); Teri Joanne Avery (Avery's ex-wife); James Maurice Christon (a private individual described as a "Tier II predatory offender"); unspecified "All Related State Actors"; and John/Jane Does 1–20.

Avery's Claims (Twelve Counts)

Avery's amended complaint alleged twelve counts:

- Count I: Due process and equal protection violations in the dissolution case (muted testimony, ex parte communications, disregard of child-custody factors, denial of disability accommodations). - Count II: Fraud on the court by falsifying hearing records and judicial documents, centered on the criminal case's bail hearing. - Count III: Judicial misconduct and unauthorized exercise of judicial power (Judge Bentz continuing in the dissolution case after the criminal-case removal; Judge Schwab presiding after alleged expiration of his authority; Judge Haley issuing rulings allegedly outside her authority). - Count IV: Failure to exercise mandatory emergency jurisdiction under Minnesota's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") regarding alleged danger from Christon. - Count V: Obstruction of rights under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and misapplication of international custody law, implicating the federal International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"). - Count VI: Wrongful retention, kidnapping, and concealment of children by Teri Avery and Christon, invoking a federal criminal kidnapping statute (18 U.S.C. § 1201) and a Minnesota criminal statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.26). - Count VII: Obstruction of filings and denial of access to a lawful tribunal. - Count VIII: Administrative cover-up, focused on McKenney's alleged admission that no documentation existed for judicial reassignments and alleged retroactive alteration of a judicial directory. - Count IX: Fourth Amendment violation for approximately 58-day pretrial detention without a prompt judicial probable-cause determination, based on alleged fabrication of bail-hearing paperwork. - Count X: Child endangerment through continued court-authorized contact between Avery's children and Christon. - Count XI: Retaliation against Avery for asserting parental rights and making federal-rights claims. - Count XII: Denial of reasonable accommodations under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") in the dissolution case.

Avery sought a temporary restraining order halting all state proceedings involving him and his children, emergency custody of his children, declarations voiding past state-court orders, removal of Judge Bentz and McKenney from his cases, reassignment to a neutral judge, a no-contact order as to Christon, referrals to federal and state law enforcement, and damages.

Procedural Posture

Avery sought to proceed without paying the filing fee (in forma pauperis, or "IFP"). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss an IFP action at any time if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.

Court's Analysis

I. Avery's Misunderstanding of Recusal

The court found a threshold flaw running through most of Avery's claims: his belief that Judge Bentz was removed from all of his state-court matters on December 10, 2024. The court examined the actual removal order and the judicial reassignment notice — both documents Avery himself submitted — and concluded that the removal applied only to the criminal case. The reassignment notice transferred only the criminal case to a different judge. Judge Bentz's separate handling of the dissolution case was lawful. Avery's December 2024 attempt to remove Judge Bentz from the dissolution case was properly denied as untimely, and his May 2026 disqualification motion was denied by written order. The void-order theory that underpinned much of Avery's complaint therefore lacked an arguable basis in law or fact and was frivolous.

II. Absolute Judicial Immunity and Sovereign Immunity

Judicial immunity bars suits — not merely damages — against judges for all acts taken in their judicial capacity, except actions taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. The court held that every act attributed to Judges Bentz, Schwab, and Haley — conducting hearings, ruling on motions, addressing accommodations, presiding over custody proceedings — was a judicial act. Allegations of bad faith or malice do not overcome judicial immunity. Acting despite a disputed removal notice or assignment describes action in excess of jurisdiction, not the "clear absence" of jurisdiction required to pierce immunity.

McKenney as court administrator was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for discretionary acts — issuing reassignment notices, transmitting court determinations, and assigning cases — performed under court order or at a judge's direction.

Official-capacity damages claims against the judicial defendants were also barred on two grounds: (1) a state official sued in an official capacity is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars federal damages claims against states and arms of the state.

III. Limits on Equitable Relief Against Judicial Officers

Section 1983 itself prohibits injunctive relief against a judicial officer for acts taken in a judicial capacity unless a prior declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. Avery did not allege either condition. His requests for injunctions against the judicial defendants were therefore statutorily barred.

Retrospective declaratory relief — a declaration that past state-court orders are void — is not available under Section 1983. Structural relief such as ordering Judge Bentz's removal, compelling reassignment, or directing how state courts operate also exceeded the federal court's authority, as federal courts do not oversee the internal operations of state judicial systems. Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment forbids federal courts from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law.

IV. Younger Abstention

Even apart from the immunity and statutory bars, the Younger abstention doctrine — which generally prohibits federal courts from interfering in ongoing state proceedings — would independently bar the core relief Avery sought. The dissolution case is an ongoing proceeding involving paradigmatic state interests (domestic relations and judicial integrity), and Minnesota's courts provide an adequate forum for Avery to raise his federal constitutional arguments. Avery's conclusory allegations of bad faith, resting on the void-order premise already rejected, did not establish any exception to Younger abstention.

V. Heck Bar on Criminal-Case Claims

Parts of Counts I, II, III, VIII, and IX appeared to attack Avery's criminal conviction or sentence. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a Section 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction cannot proceed unless the conviction has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Avery's conviction has not been favorably terminated, so these claims were not cognizable. (The court noted that Avery's Fourth Amendment pretrial-detention claim might not necessarily invalidate the conviction, but that claim involved Judge Bentz's alleged issuance of detention paperwork — a judicial act shielded by judicial immunity.)

VI. Claims Against Teri Avery and Christon

Section 1983 reaches only conduct attributable to a state actor. Private individuals can be liable under Section 1983 only if specific facts plausibly show they conspired with a state actor to deprive the plaintiff of his rights. The amended complaint contained no such specific facts; general allegations of a "systemic conspiracy" were the type of conclusory assertion that courts are instructed to disregard under the pleading standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The federal kidnapping statute (18 U.S.C. § 1201) and the Minnesota criminal deprivation-of-parental-rights statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.26) are criminal statutes that do not create private civil causes of action.

VII. Hague Convention Claims

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its federal implementing statute, ICARA, address the wrongful transfer of children across international borders. The amended complaint concerned relocations between Minnesota and Iowa — entirely within the United States. Because Avery alleged no international removal or retention, the Convention and ICARA did not apply. Similarly, Minnesota's UCCJEA statute (Minn. Stat. ch. 518D) is a state law governing interstate custody jurisdiction; it creates no federal cause of action, and a federal court may not grant relief against state officials on the ground that they violated state law.

VIII. ADA Title II Claims

Title II of the ADA prohibits qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from or denied the benefits of services of a public entity. The statute does not authorize suits against individuals in their individual capacities. Because Avery named only individual defendants and no public entity, his ADA claim failed.

IX. Miscellaneous Claims

Requests to refer defendants to law enforcement (the Department of Justice, the FBI, and judicial-misconduct bodies) were denied because federal courts do not initiate or direct criminal investigations at a litigant's request and a private citizen has no legally cognizable interest in another person's prosecution. A standalone evidence-preservation request fell with the claims it was meant to support. Claims against John/Jane Does 1–20 and "all related state actors" were dismissed because the amended complaint attributed no specific conduct to those unnamed individuals, and Section 1983 liability is personal.

X. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State-Law Claims

Having dismissed all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction (authority to hear related state-law claims when federal claims are present) over any remaining state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Disposition

The court dismissed the entire action without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Avery's IFP application and both TRO motions were denied as moot. The court directed Avery's attention to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) — the rule requiring parties to certify that their filings are legally and factually grounded — and warned that future filings must comply, though no sanctions were imposed.