Ross v. County of Lake
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:24-cv-09475
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 15
In Ross v. County of Lake, Judge Corley granted defendants’ dismissal motion, allowing amendment for some claims and denying amendment for others.
Andre M. Ross, County of Lake, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office, and the individual defendants named in the order. Ross may amend Counts One, Two, and Three and certain personal-capacity claims, but the official-capacity claims and the claims under Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986 cannot be amended under this order.
What happened
In Ross v. County of Lake, Andre M. Ross alleged that county officials violated his constitutional and state-law rights by tagging his vehicle, arresting him, booking him, collecting his DNA, and publicly posting booking information. He represented himself.
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three because the complaint did not provide enough facts supporting the claims, and because the state-law claim was filed too late. The court also dismissed claims against individual defendants in their personal capacities and dismissed claims under federal civil-rights statutes concerning contracts, conspiracies, and failure to prevent conspiracies.
Judge Corley allowed Ross to amend the claims in Counts One, Two, and Three and the personal-capacity claims. The court dismissed the official-capacity claims and the claims under Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986 without leave to amend. An amended complaint was due June 20, 2025; otherwise, judgment would be entered for the defendants.
The detailed version
- Ross v. County of Lake · No. 3:24-cv-09475
- Jacquelyn Corley
- May 23, 2025
Background
Andre M. Ross sued County of Lake, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office, and individual employees. He alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments arising from the tagging of his vehicle for abatement, his arrest, jail-booking procedures, the collection of a DNA sample, and the public posting of his mugshot and some booking information. He also asserted state-law claims and referenced claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. Ross represented himself in the case.
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to make a legally valid claim plausible. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but held that legal conclusions and unsupported labels were insufficient.
Vehicle-tagging claims
Ross alleged that defendants entered his property or its area immediately surrounding his home without consent or an inspection warrant to post an abatement notice concerning his vehicle. The court held that the complaint did not allege enough facts showing where the vehicle was located or whether Ross had a reasonable expectation of privacy there. The court therefore found that the Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 was inadequately pleaded.
The court also rejected the Fourteenth Amendment theory. It stated that an unwarranted entry is generally analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than procedural due process. To the extent Ross challenged the process for disputing the vehicle’s designation as a nuisance, the notice described an appeal and hearing process, and Ross did not explain why that process was constitutionally inadequate. The court granted the motion to dismiss Count Three.
Arrest claim
Ross alleged that officers arrested him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, but he did not allege the grounds for the arrest or provide enough detail about the warning shot he fired. The complaint did not specify where Ross stood, the direction in which he fired, or where nearby people were located. The court concluded that these allegations did not plausibly show that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to believe Ross had violated California Penal Code section 246.3, which concerns the grossly negligent discharge of a firearm that could result in injury or death.
The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the unlawful-arrest claim.
DNA-swab claim
Ross alleged that defendants unlawfully collected his DNA after his arrest. The court discussed Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions holding that DNA collection from people arrested for felony offenses can be a reasonable booking procedure. But Ross did not allege the grounds for his arrest, and the materials attached to the complaint suggested that he might have been arrested under statutes that could involve either a felony or a misdemeanor. The court therefore dismissed the DNA claim because the complaint did not provide enough facts to determine whether the collection was unconstitutional.
State-law claim
Ross asserted a claim under California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act and related state-law theories. The court held that the claim was untimely under California Government Code section 945.6, which generally requires an action against a public entity to be filed within six months after written notice that a government claim was denied. Based on the dates alleged or discussed, the complaint was filed after the applicable deadline. The court granted the motion to dismiss Count Two.
Claims under Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986
The court held that Ross did not allege facts showing that race was a required cause of his injury, race-based discriminatory intent, or a valid conspiracy claim. Because a claim under Section 1986 depends on a valid Section 1985 claim, the court dismissed the claims under Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986 without leave to amend. The opinion states that Ross did not seek leave to amend these claims.
Claims against entities and individual defendants
The court found that the complaint did not allege a county or department policy, custom, practice, or deliberately indifferent training failure that caused a constitutional violation. It nevertheless declined to permanently dismiss County of Lake and the Lake County Sheriff’s Office at that stage because an amended complaint might state a claim against one or more entity defendants.
The court dismissed the official-capacity claims against Rob Howe, Demetrius Donaldson, Jeffrey Mora, Corey Paulich, and Mireya Turner without leave to amend because such claims are treated as claims against the government entity and were redundant here. It dismissed the individual-capacity claims against Howe, Donaldson, Mora, and Paulich because the complaint did not describe specific actions by those defendants connecting them to a constitutional violation. Those individual-capacity claims were dismissed with leave to amend.
Disposition
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three, including the embedded claims, with leave to amend. It also dismissed the individual-capacity claims against Howe, Donaldson, Mora, and Paulich with leave to amend. The official-capacity claims against the named officials and the claims under Sections 1981, 1985, and 1986 were dismissed without leave to amend. An amended complaint was due June 20, 2025. The court stated that if Ross did not file an amended complaint, judgment would be entered in the defendants’ favor.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.