Liu v. Terry

Background

Zheng Liu brought claims for federal constitutional violations, municipal liability, and state-law violations against Officer Marcus Terry, the Foster City Police Department (FCPD), the City of Foster City, and Does 1–20. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a claim. After written submissions and oral argument, the court denied the motion in part and granted it in part.

Claims Against Officer Terry

The court denied dismissal of Liu’s Fourth Amendment claim alleging an unconstitutional search. Taking the complaint’s allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in Liu’s favor, the court found that Liu plausibly alleged that Officer Terry entered Liu’s private property without consent or a warrant to obtain information.

The court also denied dismissal of Liu’s Fourth Amendment seizure claim. Liu alleged that Officer Terry stepped into his backyard, blocked the side door with his foot, and expressly stated that Liu was being detained. The court found those allegations plausibly showed that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the detention was lawful under Terry v. Ohio because Liu alleged that it occurred on private property and defendants had not identified facts supporting reasonable suspicion.

The court rejected defendants’ qualified-immunity argument. Qualified immunity can protect an officer from liability unless the alleged facts show a constitutional violation and the violated right was clearly established. The court found that Liu adequately alleged a constitutional violation and that defendants had not provided authority showing the right was not clearly established.

The court granted dismissal of Liu’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive-force claim against Officer Terry, with leave to amend. The court reasoned that Liu did not plausibly allege that he was a pretrial detainee because he was never arrested. It stated that excessive-force claims arising during an investigatory stop or other seizure must be brought under the Fourth Amendment.

Municipal-Liability Claims

The court denied dismissal of Liu’s municipal-liability claim against Foster City and FCPD based on ratification. Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can arise when a final policymaker ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. The court found that Liu plausibly alleged that Police Chief Tracy Avelar had final authority and ratified Officer Terry’s alleged search and seizure by failing to address Liu’s formal complaint and instead seeking to have it dismissed.

The court granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of the municipal-liability claim based on failure to train. Liu alleged other incidents involving FCPD, but the court found that he did not identify a training deficiency that plausibly suggested deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. The court also granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of the municipal-liability claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy because Liu did not specify the relevant policy or allege enough similar violations.

The court rejected defendants’ threshold argument that FCPD and Foster City could not be named as defendants for municipal-liability purposes. It stated that a city is a proper defendant for such a claim.

State-Law Claims

The court granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of the state-law claims against Foster City and FCPD because Liu did not plead the statutory basis for public-entity liability. The court identified the affected claims as battery by a police officer, intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim under the Bane Act, negligent use of force, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The court granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of Liu’s battery-by-a-police-officer claim against Officer Terry because Liu alleged only that the door almost struck him, not that Officer Terry’s conduct resulted in contact with his person. The court also stated that the complaint was unclear about whether Liu intended to assert assault or battery and dismissed that unclear alternative without prejudice because it did not give defendants fair notice of the claim.

The court granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of Liu’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Officer Terry. It found that Liu’s allegations largely recited the legal elements and did not plausibly show conduct so extreme that it exceeded all bounds of what is tolerated in a civilized community.

The court denied dismissal of Liu’s Bane Act claim against Officer Terry. The Bane Act provides a claim when a person intentionally interferes, or attempts to interfere, with constitutional or legal rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The court found that Liu plausibly alleged interference with his Fourth Amendment rights through Officer Terry’s raised voice, intense facial expressions, close proximity, police uniform, and positioning with two other uniformed officers.

The court granted dismissal of Liu’s negligent-use-of-force claim against Officer Terry. It found that Liu did not plausibly allege unreasonable force because the door did not contact him and he alleged no physical injury. The court dismissed Liu’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim without prejudice because, under California law, negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort and Liu had not stated a negligence claim.

Punitive Damages and Case Status

The court granted dismissal, with leave to amend, of Liu’s punitive-damages claims under § 1983 and California law. It found that the allegations did not plausibly support the required showing of an evil motive, reckless or callous indifference, oppression, fraud, or malice.

Any amended complaint had to be filed within 20 days of the order. The defendants also had to advise the court by July 16, 2021, whether they were willing to attend a settlement conference. The order disposed of Docket No. 12.