Al-Mansur v. County of Alameda
- Martinez-Olguin
- 3:24-cv-06909
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
Al-Mansur v. County of Alameda: Judge Martinez-Olguin denied motions seeking recusal, finding them untimely and legally insufficient.
Sabir Al-Mansur’s requests for the judge to step aside and for referral to another judge were denied. The defendants’ attorney-fee motion remained unresolved and was to be addressed separately.
What happened
In Al-Mansur v. County of Alameda, Sabir Al-Mansur asked the judge to step aside from the case and to send the request to another judge. The requests concerned the court’s handling of the case after Al-Mansur voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice.
Al-Mansur argued that the court’s handling of the defendants’ attorney-fee motion, conduct during a preliminary-injunction hearing, and defense counsel’s later correspondence showed bias. The court found that he waited more than five months after the hearing to seek recusal and that his allegations did not legally support reassignment or disqualification.
Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin denied the motions to recuse or disqualify and declined to refer them to another judge. The court said it would address the defendants’ attorney-fee motion in a separate order.
The detailed version
- Al-Mansur v. County of Alameda · No. 3:24-cv-06909
- Martinez-Olguin
- May 30, 2025
Background
Sabir Al-Mansur sued the County of Alameda, California, and several officers over a property-tax bill. He alleged constitutional takings, denial of due process, fraud, and other claims. After the court denied his request for a preliminary injunction from the bench on November 26, 2024, Al-Mansur dismissed the case without prejudice.
The defendants later filed a motion for attorney’s fees. After several events involving that motion and other filings, including Al-Mansur’s petition to the Ninth Circuit concerning the district court’s continued jurisdiction, Al-Mansur filed several motions seeking the assigned judge’s recusal or disqualification. He also asked that the recusal issue be referred to another judge. The order addresses the motions at Docket Nos. 119, 123, and 129.
Section 144 Motions
Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, the assigned judge may first decide whether a recusal motion is timely and legally sufficient. Only if those requirements are met must the judge stop acting in the case and have the matter addressed by another judge.
The court found that Al-Mansur’s request was untimely. He waited more than five months after the hearing he believed was unfair before filing his initial recusal motion. During that period, he engaged in other case activity, including seeking reconsideration of a scheduling order, moving to strike defense filings, pursuing an appeal, and objecting to the court’s continued jurisdiction. The court concluded that this delay prevented reassignment under Section 144.
The court also found the request legally insufficient. Al-Mansur relied substantially on the court’s allowing the defendants’ attorney-fee motion to proceed. The court stated that it had not prejudged that motion and that judicial rulings ordinarily do not establish bias or partiality. The court further found that Al-Mansur had not identified favoritism, antagonism, or an improper source outside the case. It therefore concluded that his assertions did not warrant recusal or referral to another judge.
Section 455(a) Motion
Al-Mansur separately sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). That statute asks whether a reasonable, well-informed person who knew all the relevant facts could reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. The court explained that ordinary judicial criticism, courtroom management, and unfavorable procedural rulings generally do not meet that standard.
Al-Mansur identified three categories of conduct. First, he argued that the court treated the parties differently by allowing the attorney-fee motion to remain pending while striking one of his supplemental briefs. The court said that this was ordinary docket management and that the timeliness of the fee motion was an argument to make against that motion, not a basis for recusal.
Second, Al-Mansur challenged the court’s conduct during the preliminary-injunction hearing, including interruptions, ending his argument early, and praising defense counsel Peter Van Zandt’s courtroom decorum. The court found that such conduct, even if it reflected impatience or annoyance, did not show personal bias.
Third, Al-Mansur argued that defense counsel’s post-hearing correspondence suggested judicial favoritism. The court rejected that argument, explaining that it did not control counsel’s litigation-related correspondence and that counsel’s estimate of how the court might rule did not demonstrate bias by the judge.
Disposition
The court declined to refer the recusal matter to another judge and declined to recuse. Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin DENIED the motions to recuse or disqualify. The court stated that it would address the defendants’ attorney-fee motion in a separate order. This order decided the recusal issue, not the unresolved attorney-fee motion or the merits of the claims in the dismissed lawsuit.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.