Blanche v. Blanche

Background

Angel E.G.S., a citizen of Ecuador and resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota, was arrested and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) without a warrant on January 7, 2026. On February 27, 2026, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order requiring the government to justify a person's detention) challenging his detention as unlawful under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and federal regulations.

The court ordered Respondents to file a reasoned answer addressing each count. Respondents filed a form response asserting only that Angel E.G.S. was lawfully detained as an 'applicant for admission' under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and failed to address Petitioner's other arguments.

On March 4, 2026, the court granted the petition and ordered Angel E.G.S.'s immediate release on two independent grounds: (1) he was not an 'arriving' noncitizen and was therefore subject to discretionary bond provisions under § 1226(a), not the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b)(2)(A); and (2) Respondents had previously released him on his own recognizance under § 1226 and failed to show that his release order had been revoked or that any changed circumstances justified revocation. Sections 1225 and 1226 are not interchangeable, so the government's prior treatment of Angel E.G.S. under § 1226 was fatal to its claim that § 1225 authorized his detention.

The EAJA Fee Motion

Angel E.G.S. then moved for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA requires courts to award fees and expenses to a prevailing party in a civil action against the United States unless the court finds that the government's position was 'substantially justified' — meaning it had a reasonable basis in both law and fact. The government bears the burden of proving substantial justification.

Whether the EAJA Applies to Habeas Petitions

Respondents argued first that the EAJA does not apply because habeas petitions are not 'civil actions.' The court rejected this argument. Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not expressly addressed the question, it has generally treated habeas petitions as civil actions under the EAJA. The Supreme Court has also repeatedly explained that habeas proceedings are civil in nature, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly apply to habeas proceedings. The court held that habeas petitions challenging immigration detention qualify as civil actions under the EAJA.

Whether the Government's Position Was Substantially Justified

Respondents argued their legal position was substantially justified. The court acknowledged that the government's position on the § 1225 versus § 1226 framework had been substantially justified in prior cases — courts were divided, even within this district, and the Eighth Circuit subsequently adopted Respondents' interpretation on that issue in a later decision. However, the court's release order rested on a second, independent ground: Respondents had not shown authority to switch from the § 1226 framework they had previously applied to Angel E.G.S., nor shown cause to revoke his prior release order under § 1226. Respondents never addressed this alternative basis in their original opposition, and they offered no explanation in the fee briefing for why that omission was substantially justified. Citing a prior related district court ruling on the same point, the court found that Respondents' failure to address the alternative basis for relief was not substantially justified, and thus Angel E.G.S. was entitled to fees.

Amount of Fees

Petitioner's counsel requested $12,041.20 in attorneys' fees for 46 total hours: 24.5 hours through the filing of the fee motion, and 21.5 hours preparing the reply to Respondents' opposition.

Respondents did not contest the adjusted hourly rate but challenged the reasonableness of hours spent on: (1) preparing and executing a retainer agreement (2 hours); (2) analyzing the release order and communicating with Petitioner (2.5 hours); and (3) preparing the fee petition (10.5 hours).

The court found the requested rate of $267.36 per hour reasonable, noting it was comparable to a rate previously approved in this district. Applying the factors set out in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) — including the novelty and difficulty of the questions, the complexity of the facts, and the required skill — the court found the 24.5 hours spent before the reply brief to be reasonable. However, the court found the 21.5 hours spent solely on the reply brief to be somewhat excessive and applied a 20 percent reduction to those hours. This resulted in a total award of $11,148.91.

Motion to Strike

Respondents moved to strike a declaration filed by counsel along with the reply memorandum. The court denied that motion, finding that a party may file a supporting declaration with a reply when it adds important details not previously relevant. The court also declined Respondents' alternative request for leave to file a surreply, finding one unnecessary.

Order

- Respondents' motion to strike (Doc. No. 25): Denied - Petitioner's motion for attorneys' fees (Doc. No. 11): Granted - Award: $11,148.91 in attorneys' fees to Petitioner's counsel