Perez v. United States

Background

Jason Perez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute, and possessing a firearm in connection with a narcotics offense. The court sentenced him to 144 months in prison: 84 months on the felon-in-possession and narcotics counts, plus a consecutive 60-month term on the firearm-in-connection count, followed by four years of supervised release. His Sentencing Guidelines range had been 262 to 327 months.

Perez later filed an amended motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a person serving a federal sentence to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct that sentence. He also moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a statute that permits a court to reduce a sentence in qualifying circumstances.

Section 2255 Motion

The court denied Perez’s § 2255 motion without holding a hearing because the record conclusively showed that he was not entitled to relief.

Rehaif argument

Perez relied on Rehaif v. United States, which requires the government in a felon-in-possession prosecution to prove that the defendant knew he possessed the firearm and knew he belonged to the category of people barred from possessing one. Perez argued that his indictment did not allege that he knew he was a felon.

The court rejected the argument. During his guilty-plea hearing, Perez stated that he was a convicted felon and affirmed that he knew possessing the gun was wrong. The court held that these sworn statements established the required knowledge. It also explained that Rehaif did not require Perez to know that federal law specifically prohibited him from possessing a firearm; he needed to know that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. His prior prison sentences showed that knowledge as well. The court concluded that the argument was procedurally defaulted and would fail on the merits in any event.

Ineffective-assistance claims

The court applied the rule from Strickland v. Washington. Under that rule, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance fell below constitutional standards and that the deficient performance probably affected the result.

The court rejected each of Perez’s ineffective-assistance claims:

- Firearm connected to the drug offense: Perez argued that counsel should have challenged his guilty plea to the firearm-in-connection count because the gun was allegedly inoperable and he had not actively used it to further drug trafficking. The court found that his plea-hearing statements showed he kept the gun with his drugs to protect them or prevent robbery. It also held that a firearm need not be operable to qualify under the statute and that a readily accessible gun can support the firearm-in-connection charge. The proposed challenge therefore would not have succeeded.

- Adequacy of the guilty plea: Perez argued that counsel did not fully explain that the government would have had to prove the drug quantity at trial. The court found that the plea transcript showed Perez understood the government’s burden, the drug-quantity element, his trial rights, and his waiver of the right to challenge the government’s evidence. His later general assertions could not overcome his sworn plea statements.

- Competency and mitigation evidence: Perez argued that counsel should have requested a competency evaluation or hired a mitigation expert based on his traumatic background, family history, drug use, and past treatment for depression and anger management. The court found no evidence that he was incompetent. During the plea hearing, he said he understood the proceedings, his mind was clear, and he had not been under psychiatric care or treated for addiction issues. The court also found that counsel had presented Perez’s difficult family circumstances at sentencing and that Perez offered no objective evidence that a mitigation expert would have produced a more favorable sentence.

- Criminal-history points and sentencing enhancements: Perez challenged criminal-history points assigned for several prior convictions and challenged points for committing the offense while under a criminal-justice sentence and for possessing a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number. The court held that the challenged convictions and points were properly counted under the Sentencing Guidelines. It also noted that Perez was on probation when he committed the current offenses and admitted during his plea hearing that the firearm’s serial number was obliterated. Counsel was not ineffective for declining arguments that would have failed.

- Notice of prior convictions: Perez argued that the government failed to provide the notice required by 21 U.S.C. § 851 before relying on his prior convictions. The court held that this notice requirement did not apply because the prior convictions increased his Guidelines sentence within the statutory range rather than increasing the statutory minimum or maximum penalty. The presentence report and the government’s sentencing submission also gave him notice that the convictions would be considered.

- Delayed notice of appeal: Perez argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal. The court noted that Perez eventually filed a notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals decided the appeal on the merits, and Perez did not show prejudice from the delay. This claim therefore failed.

The court concluded that none of Perez’s ineffective-assistance arguments established a basis for relief and denied the § 2255 motion.

Compassionate-release motion

Perez had exhausted the required administrative process by asking the Bureau of Prisons for release and receiving a denial. The court nevertheless found that he had not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons for reducing his sentence to time served.

First, Perez repeated his argument that he was actually innocent of the firearm-possession count because he lacked the required knowledge. The court rejected that argument for the same reasons discussed in the § 2255 analysis.

Second, Perez argued that exposure to COVID-19 while incarcerated justified release. The court held that, at the time of its decision, the general harshness and health risks of the pandemic did not establish an extraordinary and compelling reason, particularly because Perez did not claim medical conditions making him especially vulnerable.

Third, Perez cited his rehabilitation and his wish to provide guidance, security, and stability to his daughter. The court held that rehabilitation alone cannot qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason and that the desire to be with one’s children, without more, would not meet that standard.

The court further held that the sentencing factors independently weighed against release. Perez’s 144-month sentence was already a substantial reduction from his 262-to-327-month Guidelines range. The court emphasized the nature of his offenses, his possession of a firearm after a qualifying felony conviction, his possession of heroin and cocaine, his possession of a firearm in connection with the narcotics offense, and the fact that he committed the offenses while on probation. The court could not find that he would not pose a danger to another person or the community and concluded that early release would undermine the seriousness of the offense, the purposes of punishment, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

Disposition

Judge Vernon S. Broderick denied Perez’s § 2255 motion and denied his compassionate-release motion. The order did not alter his 144-month sentence or four-year supervised-release term.