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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Oct. 17, 2025

Irizarry v. United States of America

Judge
Loretta Preska
Docket
1:23-cv-00237
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
17
HabeasCriminalSentencingPro Se
In one sentence

In Jorge Irizarry v. United States, Judge Preska denied Irizarry’s request to overturn his sentence, finding his lawyers were not ineffective.

Who this affects

Jorge Irizarry’s federal conviction and sentence were left in place; the United States prevailed on the § 2255 motion.

What happened

In Jorge Irizarry v. United States, Jorge Irizarry asked the court to vacate his sentence under a federal law that allows prisoners to challenge convictions or sentences. He argued that his lawyers pressured him to plead guilty, failed to investigate witnesses, failed to raise several legal and sentencing issues, and failed to file an appeal.

Irizarry had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm during a violent crime. The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of 10 years in prison and three years of supervised release. His former lawyers submitted sworn statements denying that they had coerced him, failed to investigate the case, or ignored a request to appeal.

Judge Loretta A. Preska denied Irizarry’s motion. She concluded that the record showed his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, that his complaints about the investigation and other legal arguments did not show deficient performance or prejudice, and that the evidence did not support his claim that he asked counsel to appeal.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Irizarry v. United States of America · No. 1:23-cv-00237
Judge
Loretta Preska
Date
Oct. 17, 2025

Background

Jorge Irizarry, proceeding without a lawyer on this motion, sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which permits a federal prisoner to ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence imposed in violation of federal law or the Constitution. The motion challenged Irizarry’s conviction and sentence based primarily on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

Irizarry had been charged in connection with the Wild Card Crips and a retaliatory shooting that killed Jonathan Martinez. He pleaded guilty to using and carrying a firearm, including its discharge, in furtherance of a crime of violence, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). During the plea hearing, he confirmed that he understood the charge, was satisfied with counsel, and was pleading guilty voluntarily. The court later imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and three years of supervised release.

Claims and analysis

Irizarry argued that counsel allowed him to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit and verbally coerced him. The court relied on his sworn statements during the plea hearing, his statements at sentencing, and affidavits from his former attorneys. The court concluded that these materials contradicted his allegations and showed that the plea was knowing and voluntary. It also found no prejudice because Irizarry offered no evidence beyond his own assertion that he would have gone to trial.

Irizarry also argued that counsel failed to investigate or cross-examine witnesses. The court found that he did not identify a witness who would have offered exculpatory testimony or explain what that testimony would have been. The court further relied on counsel’s statement that she had reviewed police reports, videos, and the medical examiner’s report and had consulted with a defense investigator. It concluded that the claim was speculative. The court also explained that Irizarry did not need to fire the weapon himself to be responsible under the firearm statute because he pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the firearm’s use.

The court rejected Irizarry’s other ineffective-assistance arguments. It held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States did not apply because Irizarry was convicted under a different statute. It found that a sentencing-disparity argument was unavailable because Irizarry received the statutory minimum. It found no evidence that arguments under the Speedy Trial Act or a request for severance would have changed the outcome. It also found that there were no guideline enhancements to challenge and that additional mental-health evaluation would not have affected a sentence that was already the statutory and guideline minimum.

Finally, Irizarry claimed that counsel failed to file an appeal after he requested one. The court found that all three former attorneys stated that he had never asked them to appeal and that no third party had contacted them about an appeal. It determined that the written record did not warrant a further hearing. The court also noted that Irizarry had signed an appeal and collateral-attack waiver covering a sentence at or below 10 years, and that the court imposed exactly 10 years. It found no identified appealable issue that would avoid the waiver and no showing of prejudice.

Ruling

Judge Loretta A. Preska denied Irizarry’s § 2255 motion. The court concluded that he had not shown either unreasonable attorney performance or prejudice, and that no additional evidentiary proceedings were warranted. The Clerk was directed to close the motion’s docket entry and mail Irizarry a copy of the order.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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