Johnson v. Tilton
- Laurel Beeler
- 3:23-cv-00843
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 9
In Matthew Johnson v. Tilton, Judge Beeler granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, while reserving the Doe-defendant issue.
Matthew Johnson, CCSF, and the individually named defendants; some claims proceed, others were dismissed, and the status of the Doe defendants remained unresolved.
What happened
Matthew Johnson sued the City and County of San Francisco and seven individually named defendants under a federal civil-rights law, alleging abusive treatment while he was a pretrial detainee. His allegations included delayed medical care, administrative segregation, removal of medical bedding, a jail transfer, and retaliation.
The court allowed the claims concerning failure to summon medical care, the related Bane Act claim against the city, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Mercado to proceed. It dismissed the Monell claim, the intentional-infliction claims against Defendant Ferrer and the city, and the claims against Defendants Mercado, Gomez, and Murphy identified in the order.
In Matthew Johnson v. Tilton, Judge Beeler granted the motion to strike allegations in paragraphs 20 and 47, denied it as to paragraph 95, reserved ruling on the Doe defendants, and denied further permission to amend. The order granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
The detailed version
- Johnson v. Tilton · No. 3:23-cv-00843
- Laurel Beeler
- June 12, 2025
Background
Matthew Johnson brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF) and seven individually named defendants. He alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was a pretrial detainee in San Francisco County Jail. Among other allegations, Johnson claimed that he was placed in administrative segregation without justification or review; that deputies retaliated after he pursued grievances and filed a lawsuit; that Defendant Ferrer failed to summon medical help while he experienced an increased heart rate, difficulty breathing, and chest pain; that Defendant Gomez transferred him despite medical instructions; and that Defendant Mercado removed extra bedding after a cardiac procedure.
The defendants moved to dismiss or strike portions of Johnson’s Third Amended Complaint. The court stated that the motion was granted in part and denied in part.
Motion to Dismiss
Failure to summon medical care — Claim 11. The court denied the motion to dismiss this claim. California law generally protects a public entity from liability for injuries to a prisoner, subject to an exception when the entity knows or has reason to know that the prisoner needs immediate medical care and fails to take reasonable action to summon it. The court held that Johnson plausibly alleged that CCSF employees knew he needed immediate care because he repeatedly sought help and described serious symptoms. The allegation that employees eventually took him to a hospital did not defeat the claim because the complaint plausibly alleged that they should have acted sooner.
Bane Act — Claim 9. The court denied the motion to dismiss the Bane Act claim against CCSF. The court held that the claim could proceed because it was based on the alleged failure to summon medical care, and the amended complaint identified Defendant Ferrer rather than unidentified Doe defendants as the person who allegedly ignored Johnson’s need for medical attention.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ferrer and CCSF — Claim 10. The court granted the motion to dismiss this claim. Although the amended complaint identified Ferrer, it did not adequately address the allegation that the failure to summon medical care was intended to cause Johnson emotional distress.
Monell liability — Claim 8. The court granted the motion to dismiss the Monell claim. Monell liability is a theory under which a local government may be liable for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom. The court held that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege that Johnson’s administrative segregation resulted from a CCSF policy or custom rather than isolated acts. The additional examples of segregation were too factually different, and allegations that CCSF had a widespread or longstanding practice were conclusory. The court also found the allegations that Defendant Tilton ratified unconstitutional conduct conclusory.
Claims against Mercado. The court granted the motion to dismiss Claims 2, 6, 7, and 9 against Defendant Mercado. Those claims alleged Fourteenth Amendment and Bane Act violations based on Mercado’s removal of Johnson’s extra bedding. The court held that Johnson repeated the earlier allegations without adding facts showing that the conditions departed from the inherent discomforts of confinement or amounted to denial of medical care. The court denied the motion to dismiss Claim 10 against Mercado, an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Johnson amended the complaint to allege that Mercado knew about his medical conditions, intended to cause emotional distress by removing the bedding, and caused anxiety and stress that worsened his physical symptoms. The court held that these allegations stated a plausible claim at the pleading stage.
Claims against Gomez. The court granted the motion to dismiss Claims 2, 3, and 4 against Defendant Gomez. Johnson alleged that Gomez violated the Fourteenth Amendment by transferring him to County Jail 3 despite an instruction that he remain under observation at County Jail 2. The court held that the amended complaint did not adequately allege that the transfer constituted punishment or violated due process. Although Johnson alleged that Gomez gave him a uniform associated with administrative segregation, he did not allege that administrative segregation was actually imposed, and the remaining allegations merely recited an element of the claim.
Retaliation claim against Murphy — Claim 5. The court granted the motion to dismiss this First Amendment retaliation claim. Johnson’s amended complaint acknowledged that Defendant Vigil prevented Defendant Murphy from making a formal disciplinary request. Johnson instead argued that Murphy caused his transfer through Gomez, but the complaint did not include well-pleaded facts suggesting that Gomez made the transfer at Murphy’s request. Allegations that Gomez and Murphy were friends and that Murphy was involved in an earlier strip search were insufficient.
Motions to Strike
The court granted the motion to strike allegations in paragraph 20 concerning former defendant Calderoni and paragraph 47 concerning the connection between Murphy and Gomez because the allegations were immaterial. The court denied the motion to strike paragraph 95 because the Bane Act claim against CCSF survived.
The court reserved ruling on the motion to strike the Doe defendants. The parties disputed whether defendants had complied with discovery obligations, and Johnson had not yet had an opportunity to respond under the court’s discovery-dispute procedures.
Leave to Amend and Disposition
The court denied further leave to amend. It reasoned that the case had been pending since February 2023, the motion practice and discovery had clarified the issues, and amendment would be futile for the remaining deficiencies.
The court’s final dispositions were:
- Motion to dismiss Claims 9 and 11: DENIED. - Motion to dismiss Claims 8 and 10: GRANTED. - Motion to dismiss Claims 2, 6, 7, and 9 against Mercado: GRANTED. - Motion to dismiss Claim 10 against Mercado: DENIED. - Motion to dismiss Claims 2, 3, and 4 against Gomez: GRANTED. - Motion to dismiss Claim 5 against Murphy: GRANTED. - Motion to strike: GRANTED as to allegations in paragraphs 20 and 47 and DENIED as to paragraph 95. - Motion to strike the Doe defendants: RESERVED.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.