K. v. Sonoma County

Background

Michelle K., P.K., and Kristin K. filed a fourth amended complaint asserting 13 causes of action concerning alleged abuse they suffered at the hands of their adoptive parents, Jose and Gina Centeno. The defendants relevant to this order were Sonoma County, eleven county social workers, and Amy Lafferty, whom the opinion identifies as the adoption-services representative of the State of California in charge of P.C. and M.C.’s adoption.

The County Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not adequately state a legally recognized claim supported by sufficient facts. Lafferty also moved to dismiss the claims against her. The court stated that it would accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motions, but that claims alleging deception had to satisfy the heightened requirement of pleading the details of the alleged deception with particularity.

County Defendants’ Motion

The court granted the motion to dismiss Michelle K. and P.K.’s Section 1983 judicial-deception claim against the county social workers, which was Count 3. The claim alleged that the social workers violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by giving false information to a court during adoption proceedings. The court held that the complaint did not identify which social workers prepared or submitted the reports, what specific misrepresentations or omissions the reports contained, when the information was provided, or facts showing that the responsible defendants knew or should have known the information was false. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately allege which statements were material or that the juvenile court relied on them. Because amendment might cure these defects, the dismissal was with leave to amend.

The court granted the motion to dismiss Kristin K.’s breach-of-mandatory-duty claim, Count 12. The court held that Kristin K. had added this claim without the defendants’ consent or the court’s permission, even though the prior order had allowed amendment to strengthen claims that had already been dismissed. The court did not grant leave to amend this claim.

The court granted the motion to dismiss Kristin K.’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, Count 13, without leave to amend. The claim was based on the alleged failure to investigate child-abuse allegations and the emotional harm Kristin K. experienced from witnessing the effects on her siblings. The court held that the allegations remained covered by statutory immunity for social workers’ discretionary child-abuse investigations and still did not specifically allege malice, which could defeat that immunity.

Lafferty’s Motion

The court denied Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim in Count 1. The court relied on its earlier determination that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an objectively substantial risk of harm, Lafferty’s subjective awareness of facts from which that risk could be inferred, and circumstances requiring a reasonable officer to draw that inference.

The court granted Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 state-created-danger claim in Count 2 without leave to amend. The court noted that it had previously dismissed this claim without leave to amend and rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to use their opposition to seek reconsideration of that ruling.

The court granted Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 judicial-deception claim in Count 3 with leave to amend. The court incorporated its reasoning concerning the County Defendants’ similar claim, while expressing skepticism that amendment could cure the defects because Lafferty oversaw the adoptions of P.C. and M.C., not those of Michelle K. or P.K.

The court granted Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the Section 1985 conspiracy claims in Counts 1, 2, and 3 with leave to amend. It held that the amended complaint contained conclusory allegations but did not plead specific facts showing that the defendants reached an unlawful agreement or shared a common design.

The court denied Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the breach-of-mandatory-duty claim in Count 5. Lafferty argued that statutory immunity protected her and that the adoption regulations imposed duties on an agency rather than on her individually. The court rejected the immunity argument because the cited immunity provision applies to malicious-prosecution suits, and the plaintiffs did not assert malicious prosecution. The court also noted that Lafferty cited no authority supporting her argument that the regulations could not apply to her individually.

Disposition

The court granted the County Defendants’ motion. Specifically, it granted dismissal of Count 3 with leave to amend and granted dismissal of Counts 12 and 13 without leave to amend.

The court granted in part and denied in part Lafferty’s motion. It granted dismissal of the Section 1983 claim in Count 2 without leave to amend; granted dismissal of the Section 1983 claim in Count 3 and the Section 1985 claims in Counts 1, 2, and 3 with leave to amend; and denied dismissal of Count 5 and the Section 1983 claim in Count 1. Any amended complaint was due July 9, 2025, and could not add parties or claims without permission or the defendants’ stipulation.