Calaceto v. Richardson Bay Regional Agency

Background

Caroline Calaceto alleged that Richardson Bay Regional Agency (RBRA), James Malcolm, and Steven McGrath seized and destroyed her boat, the Loveshack, without legal authority. She alleged that she owned the boat, that she and her children had lived on boats in Richardson Bay, and that the defendants treated the Loveshack as a surrendered vessel without her consent or sufficient notice. She asserted federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a California constitutional claim, a California Bane Act claim, a taxpayer action, conversion, and negligence.

Calaceto initially proceeded without a lawyer after her appointed pro bono counsel withdrew because of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court repeatedly directed her to use electronic filing, seek assistance from the Legal Help Center, respond to the defendants’ motions, and attend scheduled proceedings. She did not oppose the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, did not provide the explanation the court ordered for that failure, did not attend the May 20, 2025 hearing, and did not attend a June 10, 2025 settlement-planning call.

Motions and analysis

The defendants first sought dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legally valid claim. The motion challenged the Bane Act claim, the taxpayer action, conversion, and negligence.

The court held that the Bane Act claim failed because Calaceto did not allege that any defendant used a threat, intimidation, or coercion. Although she alleged that a person identified as “Doe” threatened to kill her and sink the boat with her children aboard, she did not allege that any defendant made such a threat or otherwise threatened, intimidated, or coerced her.

The court stated that the taxpayer action, conversion claim, and negligence claim were adequately pleaded at this stage. For the taxpayer action, the court concluded that Calaceto sufficiently alleged an unlawful use of taxpayer funds and that factual disputes about whether the seizure was authorized or followed proper notice procedures could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. For conversion, the court found that her allegations of title and registration sufficiently alleged a right to possess the boat and that she adequately alleged that the defendants wrongfully seized it. For negligence, the court found that she adequately alleged a duty of care, breach, and resulting loss, and that the defendants had not provided authority establishing immunity at the pleading stage.

The defendants then moved under Rule 41(b), which permits dismissal when a plaintiff fails to prosecute a case or comply with court rules or orders. The court evaluated five factors: the public interest in promptly resolving cases, the court’s need to manage its docket, the risk of prejudice to defendants, whether lesser sanctions were available, and the policy favoring decisions on the merits.

The court found that the first four factors favored dismissal. It relied on Calaceto’s repeated failures to follow orders and respond despite warnings that those failures could lead to dismissal. The fifth factor favored keeping the case for a decision on the merits, but the court concluded that four of the five factors supported dismissal.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss counts six through eight of the First Amended Complaint. It also granted the defendants’ Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss the entire action with prejudice based on Calaceto’s failure to prosecute. The clerk was directed to close the file and terminate pending matters and deadlines.

The opinion’s procedural history identifies Thomas S. Hixson and Peter H. Kang as judges involved in earlier proceedings, but the judge who issued and signed this order cannot be determined from the supplied text.