Cheng v. Bell

Background

Sheng-Wen Cheng, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Jahril Tafari Bell under New York’s contribution statute. Cheng sought to hold Bell responsible for part of a $509,412.93 default judgment entered against Cheng in a prior lawsuit brought by a former Alchemy employee. Cheng alleged that Bell was another Alchemy co-founder and its chief strategy officer, shared responsibility for the employee’s work, and authorized Alchemy’s pay policies.

Bell moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Cheng failed to state a plausible contribution claim, that the claim was untimely, and that Cheng’s default judgment prevented him from seeking contribution.

Court’s analysis

Under New York law, contribution generally requires two or more people to be subject to liability for the same personal injury, property injury, or wrongful death. New York courts have traditionally required some form of tort liability and generally do not allow contribution for a purely contractual claim.

The court took judicial notice of the earlier employee lawsuit’s filings. Those filings included claims for breach of contract and violations of New York labor laws. Cheng argued that allegations involving retaliation, discrimination, and emotional distress showed that the earlier case went beyond an employment contract. The court explained that the earlier complaint did not include a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Cheng’s complaint did not sufficiently identify a legal basis for Bell’s alleged contribution liability.

The court also found that Cheng’s allegations of joint responsibility were conclusory. Although Cheng identified Bell’s alleged roles at Alchemy and his alleged ability to influence working conditions and pay policies, the complaint did not provide enough additional facts to plausibly establish Bell’s joint liability.

The court rejected Bell’s statute-of-limitations argument. It stated that New York provides a six-year limitations period for contribution claims, and Cheng filed this action within six years of the July 22, 2021 default judgment. The court also rejected Bell’s argument that the default judgment itself barred contribution, explaining that Bell had not supported that argument with applicable authority and that a prior default does not generally prevent a claim against a third party for allocation of responsibility.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court granted Cheng leave to amend. It found that additional facts might cure the defects concerning the basis for Bell’s alleged joint liability, particularly because Cheng was representing himself and had not previously received a ruling identifying those defects.

The court granted Bell’s motion to dismiss. Cheng’s contribution claim was dismissed without prejudice, and Cheng was permitted to file an amended complaint by July 30, 2025. If he did not do so by that date, the case would be closed. The Clerk was directed to terminate Bell’s motion.