Bhandary v. Ghatak

Background

Samita Bhandary filed this action without a lawyer against Agradoot Ghatak, Klearnow Corp., Asvin Srivatsangam, Sandra Vindiola, Madan Ahluwalia, and Judge Stuart Scott in his official capacity. The opinion states that Bhandary is Ghatak’s former spouse, entered the United States on a dependent H-4 visa tied to Ghatak’s H-1B status, and that their marital status ended on August 29, 2024. A California superior court entered a divorce judgment in the related state-court action on September 18, 2024.

Bhandary alleged that the defendants carried out a multi-year campaign involving coercive control, legal manipulation, and surveillance to deprive her of parental rights, immigration status, property, and liberty. She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, fraud upon the court, obstruction of justice, declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02, and fraudulent concealment and intentional infliction of financial harm.

Bhandary had previously asked for a temporary restraining order to prevent enforcement of the divorce judgment. The court denied that request without prejudice to filing a noticed motion for a preliminary injunction. Bhandary later filed the preliminary-injunction motion that the court terminated as moot in this order.

Screening standard

The court had allowed Bhandary to proceed without paying filing fees. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court was required to screen the complaint and dismiss it if it was frivolous or malicious, failed to state a claim for relief, or sought money from a defendant protected from such relief.

Section 1983 claim

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and action by a person acting under color of state law, meaning through authority or conduct fairly attributable to the state.

The court dismissed Bhandary’s § 1983 claim against Ghatak, Klearnow Corp., Srivatsangam, Vindiola, and Ahluwalia because the complaint treated them as private persons rather than state actors. The court also held that the claim against Judge Scott in his official capacity was barred for additional reasons. To the extent Bhandary sought damages for judicial acts, judicial immunity protected the judge from civil liability. To the extent she sought an injunction, the court found that she had not alleged either that a declaratory decree had been violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, as required by § 1983 for injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts. The court dismissed Claim 1.

Section 1985 claim

Section 1985(3) addresses conspiracies to deprive a person or class of persons of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities under the law. The court held that Bhandary had not adequately alleged a conspiracy involving a state actor. The only conspiracy specifically alleged involved Ghatak and Srivatsangam, whom the court had found were private persons. Bhandary did not allege that Judge Scott participated in that conspiracy. The court dismissed Claim 2.

Declaratory and injunctive relief

Bhandary sought prospective declarations and injunctions concerning enforcement of orders in the state divorce case, restoration of constitutional rights and court access, and protection of her foreign property, legal standing, and immigration status.

The court applied the rule commonly called Younger abstention, which generally prevents a federal court from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings when the state proceeding involves important state interests and provides an opportunity to raise federal constitutional issues. The court found that the state proceeding was ongoing, including a hearing scheduled for October 28, 2025; that divorce and domestic-relationship issues involved important state interests; that Bhandary had an opportunity to raise her constitutional challenges in state court and had done so; and that the requested federal relief would interfere with the state proceeding. The court therefore dismissed Claim 5.

Remaining claims and leave to amend

Because no federal claim remained viable, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction over related state-law claims after the federal claims had been dismissed. The court dismissed the entire complaint. It dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice to filing them in state court.

The court denied leave to amend because it found that further amendment would be futile: Bhandary had not alleged that the § 1983 and § 1985 claims involved state actors, and the rule requiring federal abstention applied to the declaratory and injunctive-relief claim.

Disposition

Judge Beth Freeman ordered that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim, terminated the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot, and directed the Clerk to close the file.