Shipp v. Fink

Background

David M. Shipp, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Dorothy Fink, identified in the complaint as the Acting Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. Shipp invoked Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discrimination based on race and religion by his former employer. He also referred to due process, equal protection, federal employment provisions, collective-bargaining agreements, an employment settlement agreement, and prior administrative and court proceedings.

Shipp’s submissions concerned his 2006 termination from employment associated with the Food and Drug Administration, later efforts involving employment and equal-employment counseling, and litigation over those matters. He filed multiple complaint forms and several lengthy, single-spaced documents. The court described the submissions as confusing, disorganized, repetitive, and filled with legal citations that were unnecessary or unrelated to clearly identified claims.

Reason for Dismissal

Because Shipp had been allowed to proceed without paying filing fees, the court was required to screen his complaint. It had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court held that the complaint failed to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a short and plain statement showing why the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The submissions did not give the defendant fair notice of the claims or their factual basis. In particular, although Shipp referred to race and religion discrimination, the court could not identify allegations suggesting that race or religion motivated an adverse employment decision.

The court also discussed two additional problems for any amended complaint. First, Shipp had to allege facts showing that venue—the proper federal court location for the claims—was appropriate in the Southern District of New York. The court stated that the materials appeared to place relevant employment in Washington and did not show that an alleged unlawful employment practice occurred in New York or that relevant employment records were maintained there. Second, the court said that claims concerning the 2006 termination or a 2010 decision not to rehire him might be barred by claim preclusion, a rule that can prevent a party from bringing claims that were or could have been raised in an earlier case involving the same parties and a final judgment on the merits.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It granted Shipp 30 days’ leave to replead, meaning he could file an amended complaint addressing the identified defects. The court directed that the amended pleading be submitted as one document containing a short and plain statement, rather than extensive history, evidence, and legal citations.

The order did not decide whether Shipp was actually discriminated against. It stated that any amended Title VII claims would need to concern separate employment incidents in New York or otherwise explain why the claims belonged in this court and were not barred by earlier proceedings. If Shipp did not amend within 30 days, the clerk would be directed to enter judgment. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.