Callender v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles

Background

Kojo Shata Callender, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). He alleged race- and gender-based employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law. The court also considered whether his pleadings raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Callender’s claims arose mainly from the DMV’s disciplinary proceedings against him. In 2018, the DMV notified him that it sought to terminate his employment based on three alleged sexual-harassment incidents involving coworkers and his use of a cellphone at work. In 2022, an arbitrator found him guilty of three of the four charges and imposed a five-week unpaid suspension rather than termination. Callender alleged that the accusations and investigation were false or unfair and that the DMV failed to consider video evidence. He also alleged that the DMV repeatedly denied his transfer requests while granting transfers to less-senior coworkers.

Callender filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in April 2023, identifying August 3, 2022, as the most recent discriminatory job action. The DMV moved to dismiss his Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.

Court’s analysis

Claims under Sections 1981 and 1983. The court held that Section 1981 does not provide a separate private cause of action against state actors. Because the DMV is a state agency, the court dismissed Callender’s Section 1981 claims for lack of jurisdiction. The court also explained that treating those allegations as Section 1983 claims would not help because the Eleventh Amendment generally prevents federal damages actions against states and their agencies, absent waiver or a valid exception. The court therefore dismissed any Section 1983 claims against the DMV on jurisdictional grounds. It further noted that, even without that jurisdictional bar, Callender had not alleged facts showing that discriminatory intent caused the challenged actions.

State and local claims. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment also barred Callender’s claims against the DMV under the New York State Human Rights Law. To the extent the Second Amended Complaint raised claims under the New York City Human Rights Law, the court held that those claims were likewise barred. Because these claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the court dismissed them without prejudice.

Title VII claims. The court held that Callender did not allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the DMV suspended him because of his race or gender. Allegations that the sexual-harassment accusations were false, that the investigation was unfair, or that the arbitration was mishandled did not by themselves show discriminatory intent. The court also held that a false sexual-misconduct accusation is not automatically sex discrimination merely because the accusation concerns sexual conduct.

The court reached the same conclusion about the denied transfer requests. Callender did not allege facts connecting the denials to race or gender, and he did not identify or describe particular coworkers who were similarly situated in relevant respects but received more favorable treatment.

The court also held that the Title VII claims concerning the suspension were untimely. Title VII generally requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of the challenged employment action. The court ruled that this period began when the DMV notified Callender in May 2018 that it sought to terminate him, and that later arbitration proceedings did not delay the deadline. The court could not determine from the pleadings whether the transfer-related allegations were timely, but it dismissed those claims because Callender had not adequately pleaded discriminatory intent.

Leave to amend and disposition

Callender had already amended his complaint twice, including after receiving notice of the DMV’s anticipated dismissal arguments. He did not request another amendment or identify additional facts that would cure the defects. The court therefore denied leave to amend.

Judge Katherine Polk Failla granted the DMV’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Callender’s Title VII claims with prejudice and dismissed his remaining claims—construed as claims under Sections 1981 and 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law—without prejudice. The Clerk was directed to close the case.