Acosta v. Steven M. Ross

Background

Michael Anthony Acosta proceeded without a lawyer and sued Related Management Companies, Steven M. Ross, David Katz, and Lauren Geer. Acosta had worked for Related since approximately June 2010 and became an on-site maintenance supervisor in 2015. His compensation included an apartment at the property where he worked, under an agreement requiring him to leave the apartment if his employment ended or he no longer held a supervisory position.

Acosta alleged that he was injured at work in September 2021. He remained a Related employee but went on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. His doctor did not medically clear him to return to work, including light-duty work. Related eventually required him to leave the on-site apartment, although the court found that this followed from his inability to perform the essential functions of the supervisory job and the terms of the occupancy agreement.

Acosta’s claims centered on his religious objections to COVID-19 vaccination and nasal swab testing. He alleged that Related discriminated and retaliated against him under federal and New York law. He also described disputes involving coworkers, workplace policies, his personal belongings, and communications with the individual defendants.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court treated Acosta’s allegations as claims for religious discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court also considered, but rejected as unsupported or inapplicable, possible claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.

For the religious-discrimination claims, the court assumed that Acosta’s beliefs were sincerely held. It nevertheless found that he received an exemption from vaccination, refused both vaccination and nasal testing, and was not disciplined or subjected to an adverse employment action because of those refusals. The court concluded that his loss of the apartment resulted from his inability to perform his supervisory duties, not from religious discrimination.

The court also found that Acosta’s allegations about tenants urging him to vaccinate, coworkers’ conduct, alleged gossip, access to his belongings, and inconsistent policy enforcement did not plausibly show discrimination based on religion. The allegations likewise did not support a hostile-work-environment claim because the described conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive.

For retaliation, the court assumed that Acosta’s complaints about Related’s vaccination policy could qualify as protected activity. It nonetheless found no adequately alleged retaliatory action or causal connection. A proposed claim seeking an order against future retaliation was not viable because retaliation requires an actual protected activity and an actual adverse action, not merely a possible future event. The court also found that Acosta’s allegations about coworkers and his belongings were not connected to his protected activity.

Claims Against Individual Defendants

The court held that Title VII does not impose liability on individual employees. It further held that the New York State Human Rights Law did not support Acosta’s claims against the individual defendants because he had not shown an underlying violation by Related or that the individuals aided and abetted such a violation.

The court applied the New York City Human Rights Law’s broader standards but still found the allegations against Ross, Katz, and Geer insufficient. Ross allegedly did not respond to an email; Katz allegedly failed to intervene in workplace disputes; and Geer allegedly continued eating during a telephone call and failed to call Acosta back. The court found that these allegations did not state discrimination or retaliation claims.

Disposition

Judge Katherine Polk Failla granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. The court denied Acosta’s request to amend his complaint a third time, finding that he had already amended twice, had received assistance from the court in developing the operative pleading, and had not identified additional facts that would cure the deficiencies. The Clerk was directed to terminate pending motions, adjourn remaining dates, and close the case.