Smith v. Superior Court of California County of Alameda

Background

Pro se plaintiff Andrea Smith sued the Superior Court of California County of Alameda, the People of the State of California, Judge Stuart Hing, and Attorney Ronald D. Smetana. The complaint alleged misconduct connected to state-court litigation and sought $3.5 million as sanctions for “fraud.” The court had already granted Smith permission to proceed without paying the filing fee.

Because Smith proceeded without paying the filing fee, the court was required to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires dismissal if an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from that relief. The court also said it would read Smith’s pro se allegations liberally and give her the benefit of any doubt.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The court found the complaint frivolous because it failed to adequately plead federal subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the court’s legal authority to hear the case. The complaint did not identify a jurisdictional basis. The court considered Smith’s references to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 73, the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and Article VI of the Constitution, but concluded that none of those references supplied jurisdiction on the facts pleaded.

The court also considered whether Smith was attempting to bring a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It explained that the People of California and the Alameda County Superior Court are not “persons” subject to § 1983 liability. Judge Hing would be protected by absolute judicial immunity for judicial actions taken within his jurisdiction. As to Smetana, the complaint did not adequately allege that he acted under color of state law. The court further stated that, depending on Smetana’s role, claims based on his work as a private attorney might arise under state law, while claims based on prosecutorial duties might be protected by prosecutorial immunity.

The court also said that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent federal review of a completed state-court judgment if Smith was seeking to challenge or reverse that judgment. Finally, the complaint did not allege the parties’ citizenship for diversity jurisdiction and did not adequately plead the amount in controversy, despite referring to $3.5 million in sanctions and possibly seeking attorney fees.

Failure to State a Claim

The court separately found that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. The allegations concerning fraud and misconduct in a state-court action were vague. The complaint appeared to allege that Smetana filed a defective affidavit or other documents and that Judge Hing improperly exercised jurisdiction to benefit other litigants, but it did not clearly identify the underlying proceeding or the specific conduct at issue.

For any fraud-based claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires allegations identifying the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. The court found that Smith did not identify the alleged misrepresentations, when or to whom they were made, or why they were misrepresentations. It also found that the complaint did not adequately plead facts avoiding judicial immunity for Judge Hing or prosecutorial immunity for Smetana if the claims concerned prosecutorial conduct.

Immunity from Monetary Relief

The court also concluded that the complaint sought monetary damages from defendants protected from that relief. Claims against the People of California and the Alameda County Superior Court were effectively claims against the State of California and were barred by the state’s constitutional immunity from certain federal suits. Claims against Judge Hing, as pleaded, were barred by judicial immunity. A claim against Smetana based on his role in pursuing a criminal prosecution would be barred by prosecutorial immunity, to the extent that was the claim Smith intended to assert.

Disposition

The court ordered that Smith’s complaint be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous, for failure to state a claim for relief, and for seeking monetary relief from individuals and entities immune from that relief.

The court granted Smith leave to file an amended complaint addressing the identified problems by September 1, 2025. It warned that failure to file an amended complaint, failure to cure the deficiencies, or failure to prosecute could lead to a recommendation that the action be dismissed with prejudice, in whole or in part. The court also instructed that an amended complaint must include all claims, defendants, and requested relief and may not incorporate the original complaint by reference. The opinion does not identify the magistrate judge by name.