Tillman:El v. U.S. Bank National Association

Background

Delaneo-Nathaniel Tillman:El bought a house in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, but did not pay the mortgage. The property was foreclosed. In an earlier state-court action, Tillman:El sought to stop the foreclosure sale and requested $4 million, relying on an alleged federal land patent. The state court granted U.S. Bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because Tillman:El failed to state a claim and dismissed that matter with prejudice.

The house was sold to U.S. Bank in May 2024. U.S. Bank later conveyed it to Kayak Properties, Inc., but Tillman:El remained in possession. Kayak began eviction proceedings in February 2025. Tillman:El again relied on the alleged land patent and also argued that he had satisfied the mortgage by sending U.S. Bank a handwritten Form 1099-C for cancellation of debt. The state court granted summary judgment to Kayak and issued a writ of recovery directing the sheriff to remove Tillman:El within thirty days.

Tillman:El then filed this federal action against U.S. Bank, Kayak, and five unnamed defendants. He alleged violations of due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, various federal executive orders, and state law. He moved for an immediate temporary restraining order to stop the eviction and other adverse action while the federal case proceeded.

Legal standard

The court applied the four factors used for emergency injunctive relief: the threat of irreparable harm, the balance of harms, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the public interest. Tillman:El had the burden of establishing each factor. The court also noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) requires a party seeking an emergency order without advance notice to certify efforts to provide notice and explain why notice should not be required. The court stated that Tillman:El had not made those certifications.

Court’s analysis

Likelihood of success

The court found that Tillman:El was unlikely to succeed on his § 1983 claim. He did not specifically explain how the foreclosure and eviction procedures violated due process. In addition, § 1983 liability requires a state actor, and none of the defendants was alleged to be a state actor.

The court also found the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim very unlikely to succeed. It rejected Tillman:El’s theory that sending U.S. Bank a Form 1099-C paid or canceled his mortgage debt. The court explained that a Form 1099-C reports canceled debt to the Internal Revenue Service; it is not a method for paying a debt or unilaterally excusing a debtor from financial obligations. Tillman:El did not identify another basis for treating the debt as invalid or allege that the defendants otherwise exceeded the law’s limits for collecting a valid debt.

The court likewise found that the executive orders cited by Tillman:El were unlikely to support relief. It stated that executive orders generally are not enforceable in private civil lawsuits and that none of the cited orders appeared relevant to the dispute. Because the federal claims were unlikely to succeed, and because the court saw no basis for original jurisdiction over the state-law claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims for purposes of the motion.

Irreparable harm

The court recognized that eviction from a home may be a significant harm. But it found that Tillman:El’s delay weakened his claim of irreparable harm. He waited until after the foreclosure, the state eviction proceedings, the state court’s decision in Kayak’s favor, and issuance of the writ of recovery before seeking federal injunctive relief. The court said nothing indicated that he could not have acted sooner.

The court also found that Tillman:El had not shown that loss of shelter could not be compensated with damages. It rejected his assertion that removal would necessarily destroy his records and property, noting that he could preserve or remove those items and that Minnesota law requires property owners to store an evicted person’s property for a period after eviction. Finally, the court treated the alleged clouding of title as a past harm, which could not support an injunction aimed at preventing future injury.

Disposition

Because Tillman:El did not sufficiently show either a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the court did not address the remaining emergency-injunction factors. Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. The order ruled on the request for emergency relief; it did not state that the federal case itself was dismissed.