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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled July 24, 2025

Motekaitis v. USI Insurance Services National, Inc.

Judge
Richard Seeborg
Docket
3:24-cv-00885
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
14
Summary JudgmentTortEmploymentCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Motekaitis v. USI Insurance Services, LLC, Judge Seeborg granted summary judgment to defendants because the challenged email used true facts or opinions.

Who this affects

Paul Motekaitis and Carri Mangelli Kneass lost their defamation, defamation-per-se, blacklisting, failure-to-prevent-blacklisting, intentional-interference, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against the defendants. The defendants obtained summary judgment on all claims.

What happened

In Motekaitis v. USI Insurance Services, LLC, Paul Motekaitis and Carri Mangelli Kneass claimed that USI and several employees defamed them by sending clients an email about their termination and their handling of falsified insurance documents. They also brought claims for blacklisting, failing to prevent blacklisting, interference with business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court found that the email’s factual statements were true and that its statements criticizing the plaintiffs’ investigation and response were opinions rather than provably false claims. The court also rejected claims based on alleged criminal conduct or a cover-up because those statements did not appear in the email and the plaintiffs had not properly supported an inference-based theory. The court did not decide whether the email was protected by the common-interest privilege because a factual dispute remained about its recipients.

Judge Richard Seeborg granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. The ruling included the defamation and defamation-per-se claims, the interference claim, both blacklisting-related claims, and the emotional-distress claim; the court also identified statutory protection for the defamation claims against Cindy Gross and Scott Pinette as an additional reason those claims failed.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Motekaitis v. USI Insurance Services National, Inc. · No. 3:24-cv-00885
Judge
Richard Seeborg
Date
July 24, 2025

Background

Paul Motekaitis and Carri Mangelli Kneass, who had managed USI Insurance Services’ San Francisco private risk management group, sued USI and employees James D. Kane, Karen Mondshine, Scott Pinette, Cindy Gross, Ernest J. Newborn, II, and Mike Sicard. They alleged that the defendants defamed them by sending clients an email describing problems involving falsified property information submitted by employees on their team, the plaintiffs’ response to those problems, and USI’s decision to terminate the plaintiffs.

The email stated that two employees had intentionally falsified property information, that one was a close family member of Motekaitis, that the employees had resigned before termination, and that USI had terminated Motekaitis and Kneass because they failed to notify USI leadership or compliance and did not adequately investigate or respond to the insurance carrier’s concerns. The plaintiffs also asserted claims for defamation per se, blacklisting, failure to prevent blacklisting, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Summary-judgment ruling

Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The defendants argued that the email was privileged, that its factual statements were true, and that its nonfactual statements were opinions. They also argued that Cindy Gross and Scott Pinette were protected by 47 U.S.C. § 230 because they forwarded the email.

The court did not grant summary judgment based on the common-interest privilege. That privilege can protect a communication made in good faith about a subject in which the speaker and recipients share an interest or duty, but the court found a factual dispute about whether all email recipients—including at least one competitor—shared the necessary interest. Because it was unclear whether the privilege applied, the court did not decide whether the plaintiffs had shown the malice needed to overcome it.

Instead, the court ruled that the email contained no actionable false statement. The statement that USI terminated Motekaitis and Kneass was true. The statement that they failed to notify USI leadership or compliance was also true because the plaintiffs admitted they had not notified those groups when the insurance carrier raised the issues. The statement that they did not adequately investigate or respond was treated as an opinion about their performance, not a provably false factual assertion. The statement that USI had lost confidence in their ability to lead the group was also supported by the evidence.

The court further ruled that the email did not state that the plaintiffs had committed criminal acts or engaged in a cover-up. Although the plaintiffs argued that the email implied those things, the court found that this theory was not pleaded in the operative complaint and, in any event, was not supported by specific, non-speculative evidence. The court also concluded that the email’s remaining statements were true facts or opinions. For Gross and Pinette, the court identified 47 U.S.C. § 230 as an additional reason the defamation claims failed because they had merely resent the email to clients who said they had not received it.

Other claims and disposition

The court granted summary judgment on the intentional-interference claim because the plaintiffs relied on the unsuccessful defamation claims to show intentional disruption and conceded that the claim failed if the defamation claims failed. It granted summary judgment on the blacklisting and failure-to-prevent-blacklisting claims because the email contained no untrue statements or misrepresentations. It also granted summary judgment on the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the plaintiffs provided no evidence that the email was extreme or outrageous conduct.

Judge Richard Seeborg therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims.

The authoritative version

Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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