Schmidt v. University of Northwestern-St. Paul

Background

Plaintiff Rolanda Schmidt brought employment discrimination and retaliation claims against her former employer, University of Northwestern-St. Paul ("the University"), and certain of its employees, alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race and gender. The case has a lengthy prior history: Schmidt originally brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (prohibiting workplace discrimination), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and a state-law negligent supervision claim against the University, plus a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a federal civil rights statute allowing suits against persons acting under color of state law) against individual University employees.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court dismissed the § 1983 and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims as voluntarily waived. Schmidt I, 2024 WL 477166 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2024). The University then moved for summary judgment on the Title VII claim, which the court granted on the ground that the ministerial exception — a First Amendment-based doctrine shielding religious institutions from judicial interference in certain employment decisions — barred the claim. Schmidt II, 2025 WL 1592345 (D. Minn. June 5, 2025). The sole surviving claim was Schmidt's negligent supervision claim against the University.

Schmidt's Allegations

Schmidt alleged a pattern of pervasive discrimination throughout her employment. Specific incidents included:

- Anonymous deletion of her students' grades from the University's computer system. - An anonymous phone call in which the caller used a racial slur and questioned her credentials. - Intrusions into her personal workspace. - Damage to her car, including a smashed hole and, in a separate incident, the words "Leave Nigger" scrawled on her vehicle. - Two specific incidents involving University employee Philip Vierling: on January 11, 2018, Vierling entered her office, screamed at her at the top of his lungs, and had previously mentioned he carried a concealed weapon; and on January 12, 2018, Schmidt heard a loud bang on her office wall and suspected it was Vierling, though she did not confirm this.

Schmidt alleged she suffered "severe emotional distress, humiliation, anxiety, and ongoing fear," and that this stress "manifested physically, including shaking, loss of sleep, headaches, gastrointestinal symptoms, and other stress-related physical effects."

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (here, Schmidt) and give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences. The non-moving party cannot rely on mere allegations but must present admissible evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute for trial.

The University's Arguments

The University moved for summary judgment on two alternative grounds: (1) Schmidt failed to allege the type of physical injury Minnesota law requires for a negligent supervision claim; and (2) the ministerial exception independently bars the negligent supervision claim.

Court's Analysis

Physical Injury Requirement

Under Minnesota law, negligent supervision claims are premised on an employer's duty to control employees and prevent them from inflicting personal injury. Johnson v. Peterson, 734 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). Critically, the employer's duty extends only to the "prevention of bodily harm," and a viable negligent supervision claim must allege physical injury. Emotional distress, under Minnesota law, does not qualify as a physical injury for this purpose, and allegations that a plaintiff "experienced emotional distress and resulting physical symptoms" are likewise insufficient. Id. at 278.

The court found that although Schmidt's complaint stated she suffered "physical injury," she alleged no specific facts supporting a physical injury independent of her emotional distress. Her alleged physical symptoms — shaking, headaches, sleep loss, and gastrointestinal issues — were all tied to emotional distress and therefore did not satisfy the physical injury requirement.

The court also found Schmidt failed to allege sufficient facts to show it was foreseeable that any University employee posed a threat of physical injury to her. The only employee for whom Schmidt provided specific safety-related allegations was Vierling. While Vierling undisputedly yelled at Schmidt and caused her emotional distress, the court concluded his conduct did not constitute a threat of physical injury. The court noted that if Schmidt had alleged facts showing the car damage or racial slur was caused by a University employee, the outcome might have been different — but she did not. Vierling's earlier, offhand remark that he carried a concealed weapon, made months before and in a different context, was insufficient on its own to show a foreseeable threat of physical harm.

Ministerial Exception

Because the court granted summary judgment on the physical injury ground, it declined to rule on whether the ministerial exception also bars the negligent supervision claim. However, the court expressed concern about the potential for overbroad application of the ministerial exception — specifically the risk that it could shield religious employers from well-established employment law protections in circumstances unrelated to religious doctrine. The court referenced a dissent in Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J., dissenting), which argued for a line between tangible employment actions and hostile work environment claims in applying the ministerial exception, noting it reflects the court's own views. The court left this question unresolved.

Disposition

The University's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Negligent Supervision Claim (Docket No. 75) was granted. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.