Netrebko v. Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc.

Background

Anna Netrebko sued the Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc., doing business as the Metropolitan Opera, and Peter Gelb in his professional and individual capacities. She alleged that the Met discriminated against her, defamed her, and breached contracts with her when it fired her shortly after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

In an earlier order, the Court dismissed Netrebko’s breach-of-contract claims, national-origin discrimination claims, and defamation claim. Netrebko then moved for reconsideration. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally available when a court overlooked controlling law or important facts, relied on newly available evidence, or made a clear error or caused manifest injustice. In the alternative, she sought certification for an interlocutory appeal, meaning an appeal before the case reaches a final judgment, or entry of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

Reconsideration of the Dismissal

The Court rejected Netrebko’s argument that it improperly considered materials outside the complaint. The Court held that the labor arbitration decision was incorporated into the complaint because the complaint referred to it in detail and devoted sections to it. The Court likewise held that the New York Times article could be considered because the complaint quoted from it, cited it, and linked to it. The Court added that, even without considering those materials, the prior dismissal would have reached the same result.

The Court granted reconsideration of the national-origin discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The Court explained that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Netrebko needed to allege facts showing that she belonged to a protected class, was qualified for the job, suffered an adverse employment action, and had at least minimal support for an inference of discriminatory intent.

The Court had already found that the first three requirements were met. It concluded that the Court’s earlier analysis overlooked Netrebko’s allegation that the Met replaced her with non-Russian artists, including a Ukrainian artist, and that the Met treated Russian and non-Russian artists differently regarding views about Russia’s actions and Vladimir Putin. Under controlling Second Circuit precedent, replacement by someone outside the plaintiff’s protected class can support an inference of discrimination at the pleading stage. The Court therefore reinstated the national-origin discrimination claims.

The Court denied reconsideration of the defamation claim. It held that the earlier order applied the correct standard for pleading actual malice, which requires factual allegations supporting a plausible inference that the defendant knew a statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth. The Court concluded that Netrebko’s complaint offered only bare assertions of ill will and did not allege enough objective facts to plausibly establish actual malice.

The Court also denied reconsideration of the breach-of-contract claim. It held that the earlier order had considered Netrebko’s argument about the arbitrator’s authority. Independently of whether the arbitration award barred the claim, the Court had determined that the collective bargaining agreement made the disputed performance holds unenforceable because they were not contained in an approved contract form. Netrebko’s reconsideration motion did not address that reasoning.

Appeal and Partial Final Judgment

The Court denied Netrebko’s request to certify the dismissed contract and defamation claims for interlocutory appeal. It found that she had not shown a substantial disagreement about the controlling legal questions. The Court stated that the defamation pleading standard was settled and that the contract claim involved a straightforward application of preclusion and contract-interpretation principles.

The Court also denied entry of partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). Although the contract and defamation claims were separable from the discrimination claims, the Court found no sufficient reason to allow an immediate piecemeal appeal. It concluded that the parties should litigate the remaining claims to a final judgment, after which a consolidated appeal could address the dismissed claims and any issues arising from the discrimination claims.

Disposition

The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The national-origin discrimination claims were reinstated. In all other respects, the motion was denied. The request for interlocutory-appeal certification was denied, and the alternative request for partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) was denied.