Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser

Background

Carmen Aracely Pablo Sequen, whom the opinion describes as a 30-year-old asylum seeker from Guatemala, entered the United States on June 16, 2023. She was briefly detained by border patrol agents and then released on her own recognizance. She later appeared for required Immigration and Customs Enforcement check-ins, had no criminal history, applied for asylum, received employment authorization, and worked at a bakery in San Francisco’s Mission District.

On July 31, 2025, Pablo Sequen appeared without a lawyer at an immigration-court hearing before Judge O’Brien. The government moved to dismiss its removal case, and Judge O’Brien gave her 10 days to respond while scheduling another hearing for August 28, 2025. After she left court, three Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested her and took her to a holding area in the same building.

Pablo Sequen, represented by counsel, filed a habeas petition and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order on August 1, 2025. She argued that her arrest and detention violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the government had no valid substantive reason to detain her and because she had not received a hearing before detention. The respondents were identified as Polly Kaiser, Acting Field Office Director of the San Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement office, and Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States.

Legal Standard

A temporary restraining order is emergency court relief intended to preserve the existing situation and prevent irreparable harm until a hearing can occur. The court applied the factors used for preliminary injunctions: likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, the balance of hardships, and the public interest. Because the government was the opposing party, the court treated the last two factors together. The court also applied the requirements for issuing an order without advance notice, including specific facts showing immediate and irreparable harm and counsel’s written certification about efforts to provide notice.

Analysis

The court found that Pablo Sequen satisfied the requirements for an order without advance notice. Her counsel’s affidavit showed the risk of immediate and irreparable harm, and counsel had attempted to contact the United States Attorney’s Office and provided the petition, motion, and supporting papers.

The court also found that Pablo Sequen was likely to succeed on her procedural due process claim. Relying on a prior related proceeding involving similar circumstances, the court concluded that the Due Process Clause entitled her, and similarly situated immigrants, to a bond hearing before an immigration judge before arrest or detention. The court did not decide Pablo Sequen’s separate argument that the government had no valid substantive interest supporting detention, stating that the relief granted made it unnecessary to address that issue at that time.

The court found that detention without a prior hearing threatened an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty and therefore constituted irreparable harm. It also determined that the balance of hardships and public interest favored Pablo Sequen because the public has an interest in procedural protections against unlawful detention, while the government’s potential harm was limited to a short delay if it later proved by clear and convincing evidence that detention was necessary to prevent flight or protect the public.

The court concluded that immediate release was necessary to restore the status quo—the last uncontested situation before the dispute. It granted the motion for a temporary restraining order, ordered Pablo Sequen’s immediate release, and prohibited the respondents from re-detaining her without notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. The court exercised its discretion to require no security bond.

Disposition

The court ordered the respondents to release Pablo Sequen immediately and enjoined and restrained them from re-detaining her without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. The temporary restraining order remained in effect until August 11, 2025, at 5:00 p.m., pending further briefing and a hearing. The court ordered the respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue and scheduled that hearing for August 11, 2025. It also set deadlines for service, status reports, the respondents’ response, and any reply.