Chaperon v. Banks

Background

Parents and guardians sued David C. Banks, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the New York City Department of Education. They sought enforcement of their children’s educational placements at the International Institute for the Brain, or iBRAIN, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s “stay-put” provision. That provision generally requires a school district to maintain a student’s current educational placement while administrative or court proceedings about the student’s education are pending.

The summary-judgment motion concerned four students: A.C., D.C., A.F., and O.C. All attended iBRAIN during the 2024–2025 extended school year. The parents also sought funding for transportation and, where applicable, nursing services. A fifth student, L.V.F., was not part of the summary-judgment request because the parties represented that the claims concerning that student had been resolved.

While the case was pending, the extended school year ended and the Department paid the students’ tuition. The Department also paid or agreed to continue paying some transportation and nursing costs. The court noted that the parties’ submissions were disorganized and that the parents did not provide admissible evidence identifying the amounts they claimed remained unpaid. The parents also raised late-fee arguments in a later emergency-motion filing even though they had represented during summary-judgment briefing that tuition had been fully paid for several students.

Court’s reasoning

The court dismissed the claims concerning iBRAIN placement and tuition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because those claims had become moot. The school year had ended, the students’ placement could no longer be changed for that year, and the Department had paid the tuition. The court also rejected the parents’ argument that an exception for voluntary cessation kept those claims alive.

The court determined that the late-fee arguments had been waived because the parents did not raise them in their summary-judgment briefing. The court alternatively held that late fees were not included within the term “tuition” in the relevant administrative orders. It also reasoned that the Department’s obligations under the stay-put provision could not be expanded by private contracts between the parents and iBRAIN, particularly to require prospective payments or penalties.

The court then considered the remaining transportation and nursing claims. The Department did not dispute that A.F. was entitled to transportation costs or that O.C. was entitled to nursing and transportation costs. It also agreed that D.C. was entitled to nursing costs. The court therefore granted declaratory relief for those services, requiring payments to be processed in the ordinary course.

The court denied the request for nursing services for A.F. because the relevant administrative order did not specifically include nursing services. For D.C.’s transportation, the court rejected the Department’s assertion that it had offered equivalent transportation through its own office because the Department provided no evidence that equivalent services had actually been offered and rejected. The court held that D.C.’s pendency order therefore required reimbursement for transportation through the private provider, Sisters Travel.

The court relied on the transportation contract, which set the cost of D.C.’s transportation services for the 2024–2025 school year at $280,757.00, and on the Department’s concession that it had paid nothing toward those transportation costs. Although the court recognized that the usual payment process generally applies, it ordered payment of D.C.’s total outstanding transportation costs within 30 days because the school year had ended, all services had been provided, and payment had already been delayed for many months.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. It dismissed as moot all claims concerning the students’ educational placement at iBRAIN and related tuition reimbursement. It declared that O.C. was entitled to nursing and transportation services, A.F. was entitled to transportation services but not nursing services, and D.C. was entitled to nursing and transportation services under the applicable pendency orders. The Department was required to fund the specified services, process payments in the ordinary course, and pay D.C.’s total outstanding transportation costs within 30 days. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case.