Mendez v. Aviles-Ramos

Background

Eileen Mendez sued the New York City Department of Education and Melissa Aviles-Ramos, in her official capacity as Chancellor, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Mendez sought to enforce a final state administrative decision concerning A.C.’s 2024–2025 private-school tuition and transportation. The Department had already paid the tuition and transportation costs ordered through the administrative process. The remaining dispute concerned late-payment charges and interest under two contracts: one with the International Academy for the Brain, or iBRAIN, and one with Sisters Travel and Transportation, LLC.

An impartial hearing officer found that the Department had not shown that it provided A.C. with a free appropriate public education, that iBRAIN met several of A.C.’s needs, and that equitable considerations supported payment of tuition and certain transportation costs. The hearing officer ordered payment of up to $340,112.40 in tuition and $177,285.00 in transportation costs. On appeal, the state review officer ordered the Department to fund transportation services from Sisters Travel at the contracted rate for the 2024–2025 school year. Neither party appealed that decision, making it final and binding.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The court first addressed whether Mendez had completed the IDEA’s administrative process. The court held that she had not exhausted her remedies concerning late fees under the iBRAIN contract. Mendez had not appealed the hearing officer’s tuition award or challenged the tuition amount; her administrative appeal sought only an explicit finding that A.C.’s private placement was appropriate. Because a failure to exhaust deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction, the court dismissed the iBRAIN late-fee claim without prejudice.

The court reached the opposite conclusion for transportation late fees. Mendez had filed a due-process complaint, litigated before the hearing officer, appealed to the state review officer, and obtained a final order requiring full reimbursement of the contracted transportation amount. The court held that no additional administrative exhaustion was required to enforce that order. This ruling allowed the court to decide only whether “full reimbursement” and the “contracted amount” included the late fees and interest specified in the transportation agreement.

Late Fees and Interest

The court held that the transportation order required the Department to pay the late fees and interest provided in the Sisters Travel contract. The order directed the Department to fund transportation “at the contracted rate” and for “the contracted amount.” The court concluded that this language required payment of the full contractual amount, including charges that the contract expressly imposed if payment was late. The court therefore granted Mendez’s motion for summary judgment in part, as to transportation late fees and interest.

The court distinguished a decision involving late fees under a different type of administrative order. That decision concerned a prospective request under a stay-put order and an order limited to “tuition only.” The court found that the broader transportation order in Mendez’s case required reimbursement according to the contract’s express terms.

Other Rulings and Next Steps

The court denied the Department’s motion to dismiss as moot. It directed Mendez to provide the Department with documentation showing the transportation agreement’s terms and the current balance for the 2024–2025 school year. The court did not decide the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs. Instead, it ordered Mendez to file a detailed fee request by October 16, 2025, allowed the Department to object by October 30, 2025, and stated that it would later enter final judgment. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motions listed at docket numbers 17 and 20.