Farag v. Hanna
- James Oetken
- 1:25-cv-05922
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Farag v. Hanna, Judge Oetken ordered Farag to amend his complaint to establish federal jurisdiction or risk dismissal.
Ibrahim Farag and the defendants in the action; Farag was given until September 30, 2025, to file an amended complaint establishing jurisdiction.
What happened
In Farag v. Hanna, Ibrahim Farag, representing himself, alleged that defendants publicized his New York City marriage certificate to another man, causing serious consequences in Egypt. He brought claims involving emotional distress, the alleged misuse of federal documents, equal protection, conspiracy, and torture-related laws.
The court found that the complaint did not adequately establish federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. It explained that the marriage certificate was issued by New York City, not the federal government; the equal-protection and conspiracy allegations did not involve the required government action; and the torture-related allegations did not adequately connect the defendants to authority or action by the Egyptian government. The court also said diversity jurisdiction would require all defendants to be United States citizens if Farag is a foreign citizen, along with the required amount in dispute.
Judge Oetken granted Farag leave to file an amended complaint by September 30, 2025, to add facts establishing jurisdiction and valid claims. The court stated that the action may be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if he does not do so, without prejudice to refiling in an appropriate court.
The detailed version
- Farag v. Hanna · No. 1:25-cv-05922
- James Oetken
- Aug. 19, 2025
Background
Ibrahim Farag filed this action without a lawyer and paid the filing fee. The opinion describes him as a former Egyptian attorney. He alleged that the defendants maliciously publicized his marriage certificate with another man, which was obtained in New York City. He alleged that the disclosure led to negative legal and social consequences in Egypt, including sexual violence by law enforcement, isolation, and mockery.
Farag asserted state and federal claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, misuse of federally issued documentation, violation of equal protection, civil conspiracy, and violation of international human-rights obligations.
Federal-Question Jurisdiction
The court explained that federal-question jurisdiction requires a claim arising under the Constitution, federal laws, or treaties. It concluded that the federal claims pleaded in the complaint, as alleged, did not provide a valid basis for that jurisdiction.
First, the court held that the marriage certificate attached to the complaint was issued by the Office of the City Clerk of New York City, not by the federal government. Farag therefore did not have a cause of action for misuse of federally issued documentation based on that certificate.
Second, the court held that Farag’s equal-protection claim failed because the Fourteenth Amendment requires state action. The alleged misconduct involved private individuals or the Egyptian government, rather than the United States or a state government. The allegation that the United States Embassy in Cairo remained silent while the certificate circulated was, in the court’s view, only approval or acquiescence and did not constitute state action.
Third, the court construed Farag’s civil-conspiracy allegation as a potential claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which provides a remedy for certain conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. The court concluded that the claim failed because Farag alleged neither state action nor deprivation of a right protected against private interference. The court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection rights are not generally protected against private conduct.
Finally, the court considered Farag’s allegations that the defendants’ acts led to torture and persecution. It explained that the regulation implementing the Convention Against Torture does not provide a private claim against private individuals outside exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings. The court also concluded that the Alien Tort Statute could not support claims based only on conduct outside the United States. Although the Torture Victim Protection Act can impose liability on individuals acting under the authority or color of law of a foreign nation, the court found that Farag’s allegations were conclusory and did not sufficiently connect the defendants to the Egyptian government or show that they acted under Egyptian legal authority.
Diversity Jurisdiction
The complaint also asserted an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim under state law. The court said the alleged misuse of the marriage certificate could potentially be construed as a state-law claim for public disclosure of private facts.
The court explained that, if no federal claim survives, diversity jurisdiction would require the dispute to be between a citizen of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, with more than $75,000 in controversy. If Farag is a foreign citizen, diversity jurisdiction would be lacking if any defendant is also a foreign citizen. Although Farag alleged that all defendants were United States citizens or residents, the court stated that citizenship, rather than residence, was the crucial issue and that all defendants would have to be United States citizens for diversity jurisdiction to exist under the circumstances described.
Leave to Amend and Disposition
The court granted Farag leave to file an amended complaint because additional facts might allow him to state valid claims and establish subject-matter jurisdiction. For federal claims, the court directed him to address the defects discussed in the opinion, including by providing factual support that the defendants acted under the actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of Egypt. For diversity jurisdiction, he must clarify the citizenship of every defendant.
The court granted Farag leave to file the amended complaint by September 30, 2025. It did not finally dismiss the action in this order. Instead, it stated that the action may be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if Farag fails to amend, without prejudice to refiling in an appropriate court.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.