Smith v. City Of Oakland
- Jon Tigar
- 4:19-cv-05398
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 12
In Smith v. City of Oakland, Judge Tigar partly granted plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion, denied the City’s motion on meaningful access, and stayed the rest.
Ian Smith and Mitch Jeserich, disabled Oakland renters who need accessible housing, and the proposed class of similarly situated Oakland renters. The order also affects the City of Oakland and may involve the California Attorney General because the court certified a challenge to a state-law restriction.
What happened
Smith v. City of Oakland concerns Ian Smith and Mitch Jeserich, disabled Oakland renters who challenge the City’s Rent Adjustment Program under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the California Disabled Persons Act. They argue that the program largely covers older, inaccessible housing and excludes newer accessible housing, denying mobility-disabled renters meaningful access to rent-controlled housing. They sought to add certain post-1983 units to the program.
The court found no genuine factual dispute that the program denied plaintiffs meaningful access and excluded them because of disability. It granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment on those initial elements of their disability-discrimination claim. It denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on the meaningful-access issue, while leaving unresolved whether adding post-1983 units would be a reasonable modification, violate or be permitted to override state law, or fundamentally alter the program.
Judge Jon S. Tigar certified the state-law challenge to the California Attorney General and stayed further consideration of the remaining summary-judgment issues during the Attorney General’s period to intervene, or until that period expires. The order therefore did not resolve the entire case or determine the final remedy.
The detailed version
- Smith v. City Of Oakland · No. 4:19-cv-05398
- Jon Tigar
- Aug. 25, 2025
Background
Ian Smith and Mitch Jeserich are disabled renters in Oakland, California. They sued the City of Oakland on behalf of themselves and a class of other Oakland renters with mobility disabilities who need accessible housing. Their claims allege that the City’s Rent Adjustment Program (RAP) violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA). The CDPA claim is contingent on the ADA claim.
The RAP generally limits rent increases for existing tenants but exempts dwelling units constructed after January 1, 1983. The record stated that very few RAP-covered units are accessible to people with mobility disabilities, while thousands of newer Oakland units were built after accessibility requirements took effect. Plaintiffs sought to add to the RAP units built after 1983 that were required to be accessible under state or federal law.
ADA Disparate-Impact Claim
To establish their Title II ADA claim, plaintiffs had to show that they are disabled, qualified to receive the benefit of a public entity’s program, denied the program’s benefits or otherwise discriminated against, and subjected to that denial or discrimination because of disability. The City did not contest the first two elements.
The court rejected the City’s argument that plaintiffs needed statistical or comparison evidence concerning nondisabled people or rental housing generally to prove denial of meaningful access. Plaintiffs presented evidence that all 50 units in a randomized sample of rent-controlled units were inaccessible and that between 92.9% and 100% of RAP-covered units were inaccessible. The City did not dispute or respond to that evidence. The court also considered plaintiffs’ evidence that they had unsuccessfully searched for accessible RAP-covered housing.
The court held that the RAP’s criteria, which excluded almost the entire body of accessible housing from the program, obviously had a disparate impact on mobility-disabled residents who needed accessible housing. It found no genuine dispute of material fact on both denial of meaningful access and exclusion because of disability. The court therefore granted plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the prima facie elements of their ADA disparate-impact claim. A prima facie case is the initial showing required to establish a claim; the ruling did not resolve all remaining issues.
Reasonable Modification and State Law
The court explained that, after a plaintiff establishes the initial elements of a Title II disparate-impact claim, the public entity must make a reasonable modification unless the modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the program. Plaintiffs proposed adding post-1983 units to the RAP. The City argued that the proposed change was not reasonable or effective, that the City’s separate Access Improvement Program made it unnecessary, and that the change would conflict with California Civil Code section 1954.52(a)(2) of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act.
The court treated the state-law issue as a threshold issue and concluded that the existing record and briefing were inadequate to resolve whether the ADA’s reasonable-modification requirement could preempt the conflicting state-law restriction. The court also concluded that the City should not be required to defend the state-law restriction because the City had opposed that restriction and was not in a position to defend it.
The court certified the challenge to the California Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1(a). The parties were ordered to submit a proposed notice of certification by September 5, 2025. After the notice is issued, further consideration of the summary-judgment motions will be stayed for the 60-day period in which the Attorney General may intervene, or until that period expires.
Fundamental Alteration Issue
The parties also disputed whether plaintiffs properly moved for summary judgment on whether their proposed remedy would fundamentally alter the RAP. The court ordered them to meet and confer about how to resolve that dispute. If they cannot resolve it, they must submit competing briefs of five pages or less addressing whether plaintiffs gave adequate notice that their motion sought summary judgment on that issue; those submissions were due September 5, 2025.
Disposition
The court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment on the prima facie elements of plaintiffs’ ADA claim. It denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on denial of meaningful access. It stayed consideration of the remainder of the parties’ motions until the California Attorney General files a motion to intervene or the time to do so expires. Judge Jon S. Tigar did not issue a final ruling on the remaining reasonable-modification, state-law, fundamental-alteration, or other unresolved issues in this order.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.