Jacobson-Gentry v. County of Santa Clara

Background

Julie Jacobson-Gentry, an employee in the Santa Clara County Assessor’s Office, alleged two claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA): failure to accommodate a disability or medical condition and failure to engage in the required interactive process for discussing accommodations.

Gentry sought an accommodation from the County’s COVID-19 masking policy in June 2020. Her primary-care doctor provided a note stating that she had a medical condition making it hard to wear a mask at work. After an interactive meeting, the County allowed her to work from home most of the time and proposed measures for the occasions when she had to enter the office. After the County requested additional medical information in November 2020, Gentry submitted additional notes stating that it was medically necessary for her not to wear a mask. Following another meeting, the County again allowed her to work from home most of the time and offered other measures, including spacing employees apart, allowing personal leave, and having another appraiser present her hearings when masking was required.

In August 2021, the County determined that it could no longer accommodate Gentry through remote work. It told her she could use her leave or apply for State Disability Insurance. Gentry took paid and then unpaid leave. During this period, she also requested and the County explored accommodations based on religion. Gentry later accepted a job in Nevada and resigned from the County, stating that her resignation was forced. After the County rescinded its COVID-19 masking requirements, it offered to reinstate her.

Motions and Legal Standard

The County moved for summary judgment on both FEHA claims. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Gentry moved for partial summary judgment asking the court to decide that she had a medical condition that triggered FEHA protections. The County also asked the court to take judicial notice, meaning to accept certain materials without requiring ordinary proof of them, concerning 19 exhibits.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Gentry had not shown a genuine dispute of material fact about whether she had a FEHA-qualifying medical condition. The court explained that FEHA’s definition of “medical condition” is limited to a health impairment related to cancer or certain genetic or inherited characteristics. Gentry described heart palpitations and a racing heart but did not identify evidence connecting those symptoms to cancer or inherited characteristics. The court also noted testimony from Dr. Gary Ross indicating that he believed the symptoms were not necessarily hereditary, and Gentry did not identify contrary evidence in her summary-judgment briefing.

The court rejected Gentry’s argument that the County should be prevented from questioning her condition because it had participated in the accommodation process. The court also rejected her argument that notifying the County of her condition was enough to trigger the County’s duties. According to the court, a failure-to-accommodate claim requires a qualifying medical condition or disability, or a condition the employer perceived as a disability; notice of a condition that does not qualify under FEHA is insufficient. The duty to engage in an interactive process likewise applies when the employee is disabled, and Gentry had not identified a triable issue about that requirement.

The court separately barred Gentry from relying on a perceived-disability theory. It found that she raised that legal theory for the first time in opposition to the County’s summary-judgment motion, rather than pleading it in her third amended complaint or identifying it during discovery. The court therefore concluded that she could not expand her claims beyond the medical-condition theory she had pleaded and pursued in discovery.

Rulings

The court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety because Gentry could not establish the required initial elements of either FEHA claim. The court denied Gentry’s motion for partial summary judgment because she had not shown that she had a FEHA-qualifying medical condition and offered no new evidence or analysis supporting that request.

The court denied the County’s request for judicial notice because the exhibits were not relevant to the decision. It declined to rule on the County’s objections to portions of Gentry’s evidence because that evidence was not material to the disposition of the motion. The order states that the County’s motion for summary judgment was granted, Gentry’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied, and the County’s request for judicial notice was denied.