Storms v. County of Monterey

Background

Richard Storms sued the County of Monterey in an employment-disability case. The opinion identifies claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), California’s whistleblower statute, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for certain violations of federal rights by people acting under state law.

Storms was diagnosed with diverticulitis in 2015. The County approved accommodation requests in 2017, 2018, and 2019, including temporary transfers. The parties disputed several events involving Storms’ workload, performance evaluation, discipline, alleged comments by supervisor Douglas Matheson, and Storms’ complaints about workplace treatment. Storms received a 2019 disciplinary notice imposing a salary reduction equivalent to approximately fifteen working days. He also was not selected for two positions.

The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision before trial that is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome. The motions addressed eight of the nine claims, while Claim Six—failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation—was not implicated by either motion.

Rulings on Storms’ motion

The court granted Storms’ motion for partial summary judgment on these issues:

- The County was Storms’ employer for purposes of his FEHA claims. - Storms suffered from a disability under FEHA. The court reasoned that diverticulitis affected his digestive system and limited major life activities during flare-ups; the opinion states that episodic conditions qualify when they would limit a major life activity while active. - Storms was otherwise qualified to do his job. - The 2019 disciplinary notice was an adverse employment action, which the County conceded.

The court denied Storms’ motion on these issues:

- Whether the 2018 performance evaluation was an adverse employment action. The evaluation contained both criticism and praise, and the court found a dispute over whether it was negative or undeserved. - Whether Storms’ more burdensome caseload was an adverse employment action. The court found factual disputes about the workload and how it compared with the work assigned to other attorneys. - Whether the 2018 evaluation was motivated by Storms’ disability. The court found no undisputed direct evidence of discriminatory motivation and found that the motivation remained disputed. - Whether the County’s stated reasons for the evaluation were a pretext for discrimination. “Pretext” means a stated reason that is not the real reason. The court found conflicting evidence about the County’s reasons. - Whether the County failed to accommodate Storms by not reducing his caseload in 2017. The court accepted the County’s statute-of-limitations argument for purposes of this motion and granted the County’s motion on that issue instead.

Rulings on the County’s motion

The court granted the County’s motion for partial summary judgment on these issues:

- Storms’ claim that the County failed to accommodate him in 2017 was barred by the statute of limitations. The court stated that the accommodation expired in December 2017, that Storms did not request renewal, and that he did not file a California Department of Fair Employment and Housing complaint until June 3, 2019. - The County engaged in interactive processes with Storms in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Storms did not dispute that those processes occurred. - Storms could not establish a causal link for his FEHA retaliation claim, according to the conclusion section. - Storms’ whistleblower claim under California Labor Code section 1102.5(b) was barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the County mailed a claim-rejection letter in March 2019 and that Storms filed suit more than six months later. The court stated that nonreceipt did not create a triable factual dispute under the authority it followed. - Storms did not adequately allege a § 1983 claim. The complaint identified alleged rights involving medical privacy, employment, discipline, pay, and career advancement, but Storms did not support those rights with legal authority or record evidence sufficient to support his argument about a biased disciplinary hearing. - Storms was not deprived of promotional opportunities, and the County’s decisions not to promote him were not affected by retaliation. Storms did not oppose this part of the County’s motion.

The court denied the County’s motion on these issues:

- Whether the County’s disciplinary actions were justified by legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons. The court found factual disputes concerning whether the County’s stated reasons were genuine or a pretext for discrimination. - Whether the alleged conduct created a hostile work environment under FEHA. The court considered Storms’ allegations about insulting comments, bathroom intrusions, and the response to his report that Matheson snorted at him. Because the County disputed several allegations, the court found summary judgment inappropriate. - Whether there was no causal link for Storms’ FMLA retaliation claim. The court denied the motion on that issue, although it separately granted the County’s motion on the claim because Storms testified that he did not take FMLA leave in the relevant years and therefore lacked evidence of protected FMLA activity. - Whether there was no causal link for Storms’ California whistleblower retaliation claim. The court denied the motion on that issue but granted it on the separate statute-of-limitations ground.

Affirmative defenses

The County withdrew several affirmative defenses, subject to the limitations stated in the order. The court dismissed Affirmative Defense No. 19 as moot because Storms was not seeking punitive damages.

The court struck, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), Affirmative Defense Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 25–33, 36, and 38–41. Striking a defense removes it from the case. The court explained that many of these defenses merely rebutted elements of Storms’ claims rather than functioning as true affirmative defenses, and it also struck some defenses as duplicative or vague.

Disposition

The County’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Storms’ motion for partial summary judgment was also granted in part and denied in part. The order states that the following claims remained for trial: Claim One, FEHA disability discrimination; Claim Two, FEHA harassment; Claim Five, FEHA retaliation; and Claim Six, failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. It also lists Affirmative Defense Nos. 3, except as to specified California Government Code provisions, 6, 17, 23, 24, 34, and 37 as remaining.

The opinion’s conclusion states both that the County obtained summary judgment on the issue of no causal link for Storms’ FEHA retaliation claim and that Claim Five remained for trial. Because the text does not explain how those statements fit together, that aspect of the order should be reviewed against the docket and the full order.